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An Exercise in Practical Reasoning
The Idea of Feminism from a Kantian
Perspective.
‘Can we meet our responsibilities for dependent others without giving up the 
more robust picture o f autonomy, and the options o f responsibility and justice that 
make it possible? It is too early to tell. Justice theorists have constructed 
impressive edifices by refining traditional notions o f fairness and responsibility. 
However, by continuing the centuries-old neglect o f the basic issues o f child- 
rearing and care for dependants, these intellectual achievements are resting on 
unexamined and perilously shaky ground. Any adequate theory o f sexual 
equality must confront these issues, and the traditional conceptions o f 
discrimination and privacy that have hidden them from view. ’ 2
The aim of my paper is to show that there is no reason to consider that it is ‘too 
early to tell’ on the question of whether a theory of justice can meet the requirement of 
sexual equality. Moreover, it will be argued that a commitment to the Kantian notion of 
respect for persons —the second imperative: treating persons as ends and not simply as 
means3— is an adequate foundation for a working notion of feminism. In this 
perspective, feminism starts from a ‘robust’ concept of autonomy and responsibility, in 
which persons are conceived as free and equal; i.e. capable of acting reasonably and 
rationally. Thus understood, persons participate in society, in the two meanings of the 
term: each person share rights and duties, and is a partner in the basic institutions of 
society. The relevant features of persons are considered to be those capacities, rather 
than their belonging to a certain race, culture, creed or sex. *I
In all quotations in this paper, I have kept the emphasis already present in the text in the form of 
italics; the underlining is mine. I would like to thank Ian Carter, Maurice Glasman, John 
Stanton-Ife, Charles Larmore, Steven Lukes and Katherine O’Donovan for reading and 
commenting on earlier versions of this paper.
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990, p. 285-286. This is one of the few political philosophy books where a critical reading of 
recent feminist theories is achieved, and its connection to problems of justice analysed thoroughly.
I share many of its insights, if not its final conclusion.
‘Treat humanity whether in your own person or in die person of any odier never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end.' Groundwork o f the Metaphysics o f Morals. (The 
Moral Law). London: Hutchinson, 1953, p. 429.



























































































Fem inism  from  a Kantian Perspective. Introduction.
The idea of justice from which I want to start, for this notion of feminism, is 
therefore abstract and universal. It stresses the need to abstract from the particularities of 
persons, be they gender, ethnicity, culture, class or community, in order to construct an 
adequate standpoint for the principles of justice. It is opposed to relativist accounts 
which ground the principles of justice in particular languages and traditions, giving 
emphasis to differences and boundaries. As opposed to a ‘communitarian’ view of 
feminism, the Kantian interpretation on which I will base my argument deduces the 
principles of justice behind what John Rawls has called a ‘thick veil of ignorance’, in 
which prejudice and self-interest are eliminated by ruling out not only information about 
people’s natural talents and abilities, their social role or class position, but also about race, 
and sex.4
‘For this journey, you did not need so much luggage’ says Dulcinea to Don 
Quichotte. Many would argue that understood in Kantian terms, feminism has no role to 
play, either because its specificity is denied, or because its goals, being specific, are 
nevertheless sufficiently integrated within the overall liberal theory. According to this 
objection, liberal theory addresses itself to abstract individuals and is blind to the 
particularities of persons; this seems to deny the very ground on which feminism  stands, 
which starts from the difference between men and women.
What I want to argue, however, is that a strong feminist position is one which 
starts from a conception of justice which takes no account of the differences between 
persons, in the realm of general principles —I am essentially referring here to the Kantian 
notion of persons as ends, and which makes, in a second move, this understanding of the 
person effective through the conception of redistribution given by the Rawlsian difference 
principle.5 This second, Rawlsian move, concerns the just distribution of social,
On this point see Rawls, John. ‘Fairness to Goodness.’ Philosophical Review. N. 84 (1975): pp. 
536-554. My contention is that the ‘thick’ veil of ignorance thus defined is closer to a Kantian 
interpretation. This definition is already contained in A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1971. Hereafter TJ.) In effect, Rawls writes that from the standpoint of 
persons similarly situated in an original position which is fair, racial and sexual discrimination is 
‘not only uniust but irrational.’ (77., p. 149). This interpretation is in opposition to Nozick, who 
holds that redistribution means treating one person as the means to others well-being.
The Rawlsian difference principle is based on the idea of equality of concern and of distributive 
justice. It is submitted, in ‘lexical order’, to a first principle, the principle of liberty. In other 
words, liberty can be only restricted for the sake of liberty and not for social and economic 
equality. As to this second aspect, the difference principle states that ‘Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: a* to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principles, and II. attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.’ (77., p. 302; there are other 
formulations in more recent articles, but the variations do not affect the application which is made 
here.) The general formulation of the difference principle which is central to my argument would 
be that ‘All social primary goods —liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of




























































































Feminism  from  a Kantian Perspective. Introduction.
economic and symbolic goods (primary goods, understood as the social basis for self- 
respect, income and power). It obliges us to take into account the specificity of women’s 
condition and, as Kymlicka correctly points out, to re-evaluate our ideas about the 
institution of the family. It stresses the need to devote attention, on one hand to the 
challenges that child-bearing and child-rearing pose to the conception of individuals of 
both genders as free and equal citizens, and on the other hand to the family as a place for 
the education of future citizens.
It is my contention that this specificity is not only sufficient to constitute the basis 
of a definite body of theory, but that there is also a good case for the making of a feminist 
identity, based on an opposition to violent and abstract definitions of femininity 
—abstract here because stereotyped. Women have been, are, and, one fears, will be, 
submitted to definitions of what they arc, definitions that are truly abstract, because they 
do not acknowledge differences among women, and that in addition to a biological 
difference with men, women are united by nothing more than a shared domination, both 
material and symbolic. Thus, there has been and is a denial of liberty and autonomy to 
women which has taken place both in the material arrangements imposed by parenthood, 
and in the symbolic way these arrangements have been conceived of and legitimised.
The definition of feminism I am putting forward here is grounded on the 
assumption that the conflict over the definition of roles between men and women will not 
vanish in the foreseeable future. If we think of politics as a never ending task —and of 
social conflict as indissoluble; if we believe, that is, that there is no future ideal 
community where the need for politics will disappear, then there are good reasons to 
attribute a long life to feminist discourse. Whatever else changes, women will keep on 
having children —unless science radically revolutionises procreation. A discourse on 
maternity, on motherhood, on parenthood, will therefore still be made by both women 
and men, which will be the place both of reproduction of inherited prejudices about the 
feminine condition and of the struggle to change it.6 Feminism is in this view the 
conceptual means through which the specificity of woman’s domination is conceived of 
and, inseparably, an identity is elaborated on one hand by female individuals who feel a 
link to each other in virtue of this shared domination, and on the other hand by women 
and men who want to modify this state of affairs over time.
self-respect— are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these 
goods is to the advantage of the least favoured.’ (77., p. 303).
Notice that I do not mean to say dial ‘maternity’ is or should be confined to gestation and birth. 
Rather, I say that this is the only completely biological aspect of the problem, and therefore not 
modifiable at a general level by the actual state of our scientific knowledge and practice. Maternity 




























































































Feminism  fro m  a Kantian Perspective. Introduction.
It will be noticed that there is, in this conception, a tension between a specification 
and a universalisation of values. In Kantian terms, there is a constant attempt by the 
finite, by the particular, to abolish its own determinations and become the formal 
universal, or rather to be part of the universal (The faculty of judgement consists in 
‘thinking of the particular as comprehended in the universal.’ — Critique o f Judgement. 
Introduction. § IV). On the other hand, one of the necessary preconditions for this is 
precisely the conception of the finite in terms of limited identity, in order to make, in a 
reflective manner, the move from the natural particular to the universal.
In what follows, I will begin by examining why there is a need for a feminist 
theory, what its specific task and difficulties are. I will then go on to see what the 
objections to contractarian theories of justice are, and more particularly the objections to 
Kant’s essential concepts, put forward by two types of feminist discourse: one which 
starts from a radical difference between men and women’s discourses and ethical 
thinking, and a second which addresses what it sees as a necessary ‘sexual contract’ on 
the basis of all theories of justice. The sphere of the family is in this second view 
unproperly abandoned beyond the reach of just relations. In a third section I will address 
the specific problem of the family, in order to draw the main features of a feminist policy 
which starts from an androgynous conception of reason, as well as the necessity of the 



























































































Feminism fro m  a Kantian Perspective. Need. specificity and difficulty o f a feminist theory.
I  -  The need and specificity of a feminist theory. Its difference with 
other differences. The particular difficulty of its coherent elaboration.
Before defining this specific view of feminism and the challenges it poses to 
abstract conceptions of justice, particularly when using a strong notion of autonomy, it 
would be useful to ask what it is to be a feminist —what the term means— to find a 
minimal definition that could apply to all feminists. In effect, people who call themselves 
feminists fight for different and sometimes incompatible outcomes. Even a minimum 
definition like the one given by the Oxford English Dictionary, namely that feminism is 
the ‘advocacy of the rights of women (based on the theory of equality of sexes)’ would 
not be accepted by some feminists, who challenge the very notion of rights.
We therefore have to begin with what is wrong with the arrangement of things at 
the moment, that is, with the fact that the actual social state of affairs is universally to 
women’s disadvantage (considered collectively). What all feminists share is a criticism 
of the relations between members of the two genders, and an attempt to redefine them on 
an alternative basis, not based on the power exercised by one over the other. Moreover, 
feminists think that there is a specificity to the type of domination women are submitted 
to, both in terms of its analysis and of the ways applied to change it: some deny class 
struggle, others believe in it, but none think that woman’s domination can be fully 
explained through class studies. One of the specificities of this domination is precisely its 
universality. There is no example, historically or socially, of a non sexist society: there 
are more or less sexist ones, but none is neutral or favourable in the treatment of women. 
(The myth of matriarchy is precisely tha t: a myth.7) A further attribute is that it affects 
almost half of humanity.8
No society described as ‘matriarchy’ can be said to alter die fact diat the distribution of roles 
between the two genders attributes die most valued tasks to men (besides maternity, understood as 
a combination of pregnancy and inodierhood), and therefore a subordinate role to women.
This requires an explanadon: until very recently, demographers thought that women made up the 
majority of world’s population, but they do not. Although at birth there is a proportion of 52 
male children for 48 female, women seem naturally hardier dtan men. Given similar health care 
and nutrition, they not only live considerably longer Uian men, but they have better survival rates, 
at every age, including in the womb; they therefore would outnumber men, if treated in the same 
manner. However, due to unequal care between men and women in many parts of the world, this 
proportion is reversed, as the economist Amartya Sen has shown, in an article titled: ‘More than 
100 million women are missing.’ (New York Review o f Books. December, 20, 1990, pp. 61-66.) 
He writes: ‘A great many more than hundred million women are simply not there because women 
are neglected compared with men. If this situation is to be corrected by political action and public 
policy, the reasons why there are so many “missing” women must be understood. We confront 
here what is clearly one of the more momentous, and neglected, problems facing the world today.’



























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Need, specificity and difficulty o f a feminist theory.
In spite of these reasonable features (opposing female domination), the prevailing 
image of feminism is that of women as relentlessly antagonistic to men, and as behaving 
in a manner that is described as both unconscionable and unfairly ready to find male 
domination where it does not exist. The Amazons, the Valkyries, those women more 
male then men, who also wilfully fight them provide a mythical resource always at hand. 
On this it is interesting to note that feminism appeared in etymological origin as a word 
used not only to demand women’s rights, but also in a discourse fearful of women’s 
‘male’ attitude, of the risk of confusion between roles. In effect, even if the term 
‘feminism’ is said to have been coined as early as 1837 by Charles Fourier, feminism  
was also in the nineteenth century a medical term that described the underdevelopment of 
a male body —considered ‘feminine’* 9—; it subsequently was applied to the political 
sphere, to define a ‘virilisation’ of women, whose insistence that the public sphere was 
also theirs was seen as contrary to ‘femininity’. (Similarly, definitions in political 
dictionaries of the beginning of the 19^- century reflect uses of the adjective public that 
in combination with women create new depreciative meanings: a public woman is a 
‘citoyenne’, a ‘tricotteuse’, a prostitute.) Only much later would the positive meaning of 
feminism, as a position advocating for women’s rights, be definitely fixed. It is however 
obvious that a fear of confusion between gender roles, or at the very least a sheer 
resistance to the position described under the general term of feminism never completely 
disappeared. (The negative features associated with the term are visible in uses such as T 
am not a feminist b u t...’, made by women who want to advance what could be described 
as ‘feminist’ demands, without having to face the antagonistic reactions that the word still 
provokes.)
The violence of the adjectives and images projected on to feminists comes as a 
surprise when one begins by recognising the obvious inadequacy of the actual structure 
of roles between men and women in our and all societies, to greater or lesser extents. A 
first hypothesis explaining the irate or at least cynical attitude provoked by the mere 
mention of the word feminism in people of very different beliefs and commitments could 
be that it implies a definition of masculinity which is instinctively refused. There is some 
irony, if my hypothesis is right, in the fact that the same persons who have quietly 
listened to statements about what women are, or even created new definitions of the
Gainful employment, women's education and economic rights, including property rights are 
among the ‘crucial variables’ affecting women’s chances of survival, according to the survey Sen 
has made comparing countries of same economic and cultural development, and yet different ratio 
of women to men. This constitutes a further empirical reason to devote attention to those factors.
9 See Fraisse, Geneviève. Muse de la Raison. La démocratie exclusive el la différence des sexes. 
Paris: Alinéa, 1990. ‘Feminism’ was in 1892 Guérin’s term for the arrest of development of the 
male toward the age of puberty ‘which gives to it somewhat the attributes of the female.’ —cf. 
Trésor de la langue française. Dictionnaire de la langue du XlX^me et du X ) fme siècles (1789- 
1960). Tome 8. Paris: Ed. du CNRS, 1980.



























































































Feminism fro m  a Kantian Perspective. Need, specificity and difficulty o f  a feminist theory.
essence of femininity themselves, find it so disturbing that the mirror be turned the other 
way. At any rate, this image of enraged, frenzied women making immoderate claims 
‘against’ men misses a fact which, as I said, unites all feminists: that at some point in 
their life they have been faced, either personally or as witnesses, generally both, with 
unfair treatment on the sole basis of a condition of birth, treatment which submits women 
as such, both to discrimination and to domination. There is no example of a country 
where professional opportunities, salaries, and responsibilities are open in the same way 
to both men and women, among other reasons because the rearing of children is 
everywhere still heavily carried by women, and because much effort is not made, in most 
places, to facilitate the compatibility of child-rearing and paid labour. Domestic violence 
and the degradation of women have nowhere been eradicated. In many parts of the 
world, the fact that women are neglected compared with men still affects their chances of 
survival.10 A strong sense that current social arrangements are everywhere unfair to 
women is unavoidable. Hence the conviction that any theory of justice which does not 
offer an answer to this cardinal question is incomplete and therefore unconvincing. To 
return to the formulation of the Rawlsian difference principle given before, none of the 
primary goods, liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect, 
are distributed equally along gender lines, a state of affairs which it would be difficult to 
describe as being to the greater advantage of the least well off —even if some would 
indeed describe it as such.
I would argue that a good way of defining feminism would be to conceive of it in 
the first place as a struggle for recognition:: recognition that women are not a sub- 
category of men, recognition that they legitimately have a say about their own identity and 
about its modification, recognition of their role, place and needs in society, but more than 
anything else, recognition as full autonomous members of society. It must however 
immediately be emphasised that the peculiarity of feminist debate consists in the fact that 
this struggle for recognition cannot start from a denied culture affirmed, but rather from 
the fact of a culture of domination which supposes, inseparably, a definition of what 
women are. In all cultures, women who want to challenge the fact of discrimination and 
domination are faced with the dilemma that the culturally inherited meaning of what they 
are is inseparable from the relationship of domination through which they have been 
defined. What it means to be a woman, the positive and negative values attached to it, 
are rooted in the gender division of roles passed on from one generation to the other. The




























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Need. specificity and difficulty o f  a feminist theory.
vindication as well as the rejection of traditional feminine values'1 —sensitivity, 
affectivion, gentleness, care, delicacy, lack of agressivity— are bound to be built on 
claims about women’s nature with no point of comparison, virtually no alternative 
historical practice to refer to. Women are therefore left with the false choice between 
vindicating ‘femininity’, that is the traditional value which legitimises their subordinate 
role, or leaving aside this femininity and playing in the masculine world, with its rules, 
which means a constant fight against their second ‘cultural’ nature, on the psychological 
level, or against prejudices of all sorts, on the social level.
Moreover, the particularity of the problem faced by feminism concerning other 
differences (cultural or ethnic), is that it crosses boundaries —there is no society without 
women, who constitute the largest dominated minority on earth. Women are condemned, 
as such, always to be a sub-version of the considered culture. (By which I mean that 
they are fragmented in different cultures and social roles, in which they always have, 
considered collectively, a subordinate position to men, but that they do not have a cultural 
model of their own, apart from the fact of subordination.) This obviously raises 
particular problems on the theoretical level, as the effort of imagination women have to 
make is entirely constructivist: there is no tradition other than one of the conquest of 
parcels of citizenship to look back on, no shared language other than the universal fact of 
domination to refer to. In other words: the starting point is only negative.
This poses at least two philosophical difficulties. One is that the lack of a feminist 
tradition, in the strong sense of the term, means the absence of the usual way paradigms 
are revised inside each tradition, by both rational mechanisms and unconscious 
progressive adaptation to new or recently visible realities. ‘Femininity’ is not a tradition, 
but each tradition has its own definition of femininity. ‘Femininity’ implies therefore no 
autonomous self-understanding: it is only the set of stereotyped characters attributed to 
women in each culture, which work as a legitimation of their confinement to certain tasks 
and spheres. This means that the critical revision of femininity that feminism implies 
lacks a basis in a consistently self-understood tradition: feminism seems to start every 
time anew, perpetually to have to find a legitimacy for its existence, to constantly fight the 
same battles and reproduce identical confrontations.
Throughout this paper, the word ‘traditional’ will be used to describe an idea of women that 
consigns them to the private rather than to the public sphere, to children’s up bringing radier than 
to paid work performed in the market-place, and to care of others rather Ulan to the development of 
their own, autonomously defined, talents. This definidon does not correspond to any ‘tradition’ in 
particular, and is simply meant as an ideal-typical point to be opposed to the idea of autonomy and 
individuality on which I will base my argument. Accordingly, it does not imply a preconceived 
negadve idea of traditions, their role and effects.



























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Need, specificity and difficulty o f  a feminist theory.
The second, and for the purpose of this paper more central difficulty, concerns 
the problem of applying, on ethical ground, the Kantian idea of universalisability. How 
are women to adopt the point of view of the other when the genetic difference between 
men and women is reproduced, without possibility of ‘métissage’? This is the essential 
contrast with race, but a contrast which makes all the difference: the ‘métis’ is a reality, 
the androgynous is not, and will not be within the foreseable future. Are we then to think 
in androgynous terms, knowing that it is an abstraction with no possible representation in 
reality, or are we to define roles in a way that they will discriminate between men and 
women, and make assumptions concerning a dualist human essence, on the basis of the 
ineradicability of a biological difference?
Posed in those terms the question does not look hopeful; we seem faced with an 
impossible choice between the denial of the fact of difference and turning it into an 
indisputable and unchallengeable basis for the definition of a clearly different telos in life 
for men and women. It is however my contention that these apparent aporias can be 
resolved by answering this question in two stages. At the abstract level, principles 
should be worked out in an androgynous way, so that they lead to institutions justifiable 
to both men and women. In the second move, however, those abstract principles should 
be applied in a way which addresses the specific difficulties that the indissoluble natural 
difference between men and women, especially concerning procreation, pose to a theory 
based on the ideas of autonomy and individuality.
To achieve this, it is important to begin by asking what is the exact extent of the 
biological12 difference between women and men, and its subsequent implications for 
social organisation, institutions and roles. In effect, most of the reflection on women’s 
condition start from postulates on women’s nature, without always making them explicit, 
and with little subsequent effort to justify them. Women’s ‘nature’, child-bearing and 
child-rearing, sentiments and feelings, love and care as opposed to rational abstract 
thinking, devotion to others versus career achievement, all those aspects appear in 
definitions of what women are, conflating discrete aspects, in a way that tells us more 
about the belief of people who utter them than about the ‘true nature’ of the problem. A 
reflection on natural or biological differences is however necessary, because it lies behind 
the legitimisation of women’s domination, but also because imperfect deliberation on the 
limited natural differences between men and women provokes a differential response to
2 I prefer the term ‘biological’ to ‘natural’, because the second is generally used in the context of a 
reflection opposing nature and culture. To say that women have a biological difference does not 
mean that this difference is not culturally lived and structured: it is biological anil cultural rather 
than natural.



























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Need. specificity and difficulty o f a feminist theory.
racial and gender discrimination. The complete rejection of the former is widely shared; 
putting the latter in the list of priorities for a reflection on justice which still has to be 
argued for. Many would be willing to be defined as anti-racists, far fewer as feminists or 
anti-macho. Rawls claims that racial and sexual discrimination are ‘not only unjust but 
irrational’; the latter category does not however come to consciousness in the same crude 
way as the former, because many aspects of it are unreflectingly seen as ‘natural’. To 
give but one example, if advertisements which use a stereotyped vision of women treated 
ethnic minorities in the same way, the chances are that they would produce a higher level 
of indignation and debate.
As for men and women’s nature, it seems that only one thing is certain: women 
have a womb and men do not, and this will remain, given the current state of scientific 
knowledge. (I do not mean to commit myself on the question of whether we should hope 
that science may free women from child-bearing). As such, this fact does not tell us 
much about abstract reason, nor about child-rearing. Once children are outside their 
mother’s womb, nothing is left to women alone, on the basis of their nature, as even 
breast feeding can be substituted by artificial milk. (Again: this is not to be read as a 
statement in favour of, or against breast feeding.) On the sole basis of this biological 
difference, it seems difficult to make assumptions about women’s role in life as regards 
children and family. Yet those assumptions are made and reproduced. Hence the feeling 
some women have that society has used them to reproduce itself, that they never had the 
possibility of reconsidering the consequences of a choice which has severed them not 
only from the full development of their capacities but also from an involvement in 
society, including public participation in it (and therefore of the control over decisions 
that affect them and those they care for); a conviction that something very unfair and 
unreasonable has occurred to them.
How should a just society meet the problems of natural and social inequality, so 
as to provide the widest possible basis for women to be full autonomous subjects? In 
what follows, I want to put forward a view of feminism based on Kant’s notion that 
principles central to justice should be universalizable, that is that they should be defined 
so that they could be adopted by all rational agents, male and female, and to do so using 
the reconstruction made by John Rawls of this notion, in the sphere of public justice, 
under the title: ‘Kantian constructivism’.13 However, as it seems undeniable that neither 
Kant nor Rawls have set it as one of their primary tasks to propose a theory addressing in
3 See Rawls, John. ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. Rational and Full Autonomy.’ The 
Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. LXXV1I, n. 9 (September 1980).



























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Need, specificity and difficulty o f  a feminist theory.
specific form the problem of women’s subjection, it will be my aim at the end of this 
paper to point out the directions in which Kantian feminism can develop.
I shall begin by examining two lines of objection to contract theory at large, one 
which affirms that the irreducible duality of humanity has implications for the way men 
and women relate to the spheres of public and private life and to justice, reason, love and 
care, and the other which argues that blindness to the problem of male domination in 
classical contract theory has had the effect of describing as gender-neutral roles and 
institutions which have in fact been defined to suit men’s interest. I will then propose an 
alternative to both views in terms of Kantian ethics. Here, as Rawls would put it, the 
adjective Kantian ‘expresses analogy and not identity’, especially as 1 want to distance 
myself from Kant’s conception of the state. On this Kantian view of feminism all 
members of society should be enabled to make mutually acceptable to one another their 
shared institutions, including the institution of the family. This means that all social 
institutions, including basic arrangements concerning the family, have to be conceived in 
a way that can be justified to all citizens, whatever their position, their particular interests, 
and their gender.



























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists’ objections to contract theory.
II - Feminists’ objections to contract theory.
The objections presented by feminists to contract theory —both classical (mainly 
Locke, Rousseau and Kant) and neo-contractarian (Rawls)— and hence to the 
perspective I am adopting here are generally of two sorts.
L The first concerns the problem of identity. On this view, liberals start from 
the assumption that they can elaborate a theory that does not take into 
consideration embodied and embedded differences. They deny, among other 
things, gender difference. Though they claim to have a universal discourse, they 
are bound to generalise an idea of the self which is in fact gender, or rather male 
coded (or structured), and therefore to deny, oppress and mask female identity 
and specificity. Consequently, they present female qualities and inclinations as 
inferior, when they acknowledge them at all.
Z. The second concerns the problem of exploitation and domination, 
camouflaged behind a discourse of universality of values. This second objection 
does not start from different identities, but rather from the gender division of 
labour. On this view, the principles of justice at which classical and neo- 
contractarian theorists arrive are presented as universal, but they do not challenge 
the specific site of male domination, namely the family. Moreover, by making 
assumptions about individuals as heads of families on the one hand, and by 
neglecting the issue of child-rearing on the other, they leave the problems of the 
gender division of labour unexamined, and legitimise it instead of challenging it.
In the following two sections, I will examine each of those two objections in turn, 
in order to answer two questions: L_ Is abstract reasoning bound to deny or disguise 
women’s difference? and Z Do the assumptions about the role of women in the family 
invalidate contract theory as a philosophical tradition? This second question will be 
answered in connection with the first set of problems concerning women’s identity. It 
will be my contention in this second section that the question of identity is better posed in 
terms of the recognition of women as full autonomous subjects. This poses radical 
challenges to the family as an institution which reproduces gender division; it also gives 
rise to definite problems for an education policy committed at the same time to a protected 
sphere of privacy, intimacy and individuality (and, consequently, to a certain idea of 
toleration), and to the availability of the same resources and space for the autonomous 
definition and revision of each individual’s idea of the good life for both genders.



























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists ’ objections to contract theory.
1. The ‘gynaeceist’ conception of feminism.
Some contemporary feminists claim that only a gendered account of rationality, as 
opposed to a universal one, is valid. Women care not for abstract but for particular 
others; this is dismissed as moral immaturity by contract theory. Justice and rights are 
male; love and care are female. Care and love are on this view not only different but 
opposed to justice and rationality, and there is therefore an imposition of the second as 
the only legitimate (male) discourse. To the vision of the universalised ghetto which 
some communitarians seem to convey, this version of feminism adds a vision of the 
universalised gynaeceum, of a women’s quarters in rationality, as well as in the tasks in 
life.
This view is most powerfully expressed in Carol Gilligan’s famed work on the 
different moral development of women and men, and their subsequent different moral 
o rien ta tions.14 Gilligan starts with the differentiation between two types of 
‘responsibility’, a central notion in contract theory, one which has a commitment to 
abstract obligations, and the other as responsive to particular relationships. She claims 
that ‘The values of justice and autonomy, presupposed in current theories of human 
growth and incorporated into definitions of morality and the self, imply a view of the 
individual as separate and of relationships as either hierarchical or contractual, bound by 
the alternatives of constraint and co-operation’15, an opposition she wishes to deny. 
Gilligan’s work is by now widely known, as is the fact that her main aim was to prove 
that women’s moral responses were not inferior but different. I will therefore only 
summarise in what follows some of the problems that can derive from (cn ) the 
affirmation of a clear segregation between two types of moral development and ethics, 
and (b. ) the assignation of some superiority to what are seen by ethics of care theorists 
as ‘female’ moral dispositions, that is an attitude seeking responses to particular cases, in 
the context of concrete care responsibilities and relations.
The first problem which derives from the ethics of care is that women are seen as 
a coherent moral category, opposed to another undistinguished moral category of self and 
agents: men. A second, related problem is that the public sphere, which is the place of 
diversity, of the confrontation of a plurality of discourses, and ideally a common world
1 4 Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. 
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.
1 5 Gilligan, Carol. ‘Remapping the Moral Domain’. In: Heller, T„ Sosna, M. and Wellbury, D 
(eds.) Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy. Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986, p. 242.



























































































Feminism fro m  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists' objections to contract theory.
of dialogue between different ‘voices’ is in this view beyond the reach of women in 
general. Some theorists have recently argued that there is some public significance to 
Gilligan’s approach; in effect, they assume that it could constitute the basis for an 
alternative public morality, in which attention to concrete, particular cases would be 
developed in contrast with the abstract and uncontextualised morality that right based 
theories elaborate. However, it remains unexplained how the concrete care moral 
principles applies in the political sphere, that is, in a sphere characterised by the fact that 
people do not know or see each other, where the ethical community is an ‘imagined 
community’ and where principles must be arrived at through a process of abstraction that 
Gilligan and her followers would a priori reject, and describe as male rationalist
As to the vision of women’s moral dispositions that the ethics of care authors are 
proposing, it tends to reduce feminine cultural orientations to the classical Christian 
vision embodied in the virgin Mary (as opposed to Mary Magdalena). Mary does not 
create or procreate, she does not give meaning, which is left to the masculinised figure of 
God, but she protects in her womb, she is the bearing, nurturing and caring figure.16 
This new traditionalism, which turns traditional feminine virtues into the feminine virtues 
and, moreover, the virtues of feminism, can be seen as the exaltation of the status quo. 
Sociologically, however, its relative popularity could be read as the expression of a real 
sense of uneasiness that women experience when confronted on the one hand with the 
fact of domination, and on the other hand with the incapacity to successfully argue 
against it, without shifting to what are seen as ‘male’ values. Women are faced with 
personal and generational investments —which, rather than viewed in terms of the values 
of care and love, are better described in concrete material terms: number of plates 
washed, of beds made, of shirts ironed and of other accessory, and unconsidered jobs, 
which receive virtually no compensation either at the material level, nor, which is worse, 
at the symbolic level of prestige or recognition. Women do develop ‘moral dispositions’ 
of care, appropriate to particular cases rather than seeking universal applicability when 
they are confined, either really or conceptually, partly or totally, to the private sphere. 
One obvious virtue of the ethics of care is therefore to turn those investments into 
something positive, to reconcile women with a role which society is all too ready to give 
them. This theory does so through a move which transforms such oppression into a 
virtue, and eventually, through choice, into a new, domestic version of ‘female is 
beautiful’. However, it does not prepare women placed in a traditional role to understand 
what I would call the ‘reasonable egoism’ of their children and other relatives they ‘care’
6 Note that this does not mean that Christian thought only plays with this image of femininity. 
Among Christian saints and female ‘heroes’ there are some active and perhaps even proto-feminist 




























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists' objections to contract theory.
for, that is, that caring for persons does not reasonably imply the right to dictate what 
others should do with their life.
Leaving aside this sociological explanation, it does not seem enough to emphasise 
the similarity between traditional society division of roles and the ethics of care. The 
question is whether this vision of the woman’s role has some plausibility and some 
consistency. We saw that one of the effects of exclusion —here an exclusion from the 
world of abstract reason, and, to a large extent, from the public sphere— is that the 
excluded, here women, are viewed as a single, undifferentiated category. This leaves 
men free to define their identity in a plural way, inherent in the political public sphere and 
to use reason against natural determinations, whereas women are locked up in one single 
identity. The division of roles is therefore not the real problem, but rather the denied 
capacity to contest an a priori identity made essence, which is imposed on each female 
individual. As the two images of self and of thinking of responsibilities defined by the 
‘ethic of justice’ —based on rights and reason— and the ‘ethic of care’ are, according to 
Gilligan ‘fundamentally incompatible’17, no room is left, precisely, for rational 
engagement with the latter. Women who believe that the world of abstract reason is also 
theirs would therefore be described by using a new version of ‘false consciousness’; they 
would be said to ignore the real roots of their domination.
There is however no reason to think that justice and care are gender coded. Men 
and women can and often do share concern for rights, and care for their children. Justice 
and care do not stand on the same ground, do not have the same logic, do not address the 
same issues but can and do cohabit in people’s lives and minds. Only a theory which 
sees an incompatibility between virtuous caring and justice can make this radical 
segregation, though it is still left with the problem of explaining how these two logics 
coexist in the same culture, in the same lives. Besides, ‘Children need love to develop 
properly’ —which seems to be the general assumption behind the ethics of care— is as 
abstract a proposition as ‘People have equal rights.’; and the latter demands as much 
attention to particular situations as the former.
In this respect, the mistake on which the ethics of care rests is the assumption that 
abstract principles are fundamentally context insensitive. However, what is implied by 
the notion of abstract right is simply that no matter how little sympathy one can evoke in 
one’s neighbours, parents, and other concrete persons one is in contact with, one can 
count on certain benefits and rights, which are granted only on the basis that one is a 
person. Abstract reasoning implies no subsequent detachment from reality. Principles




























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists’ objections to contract theory.
are intended to apply to particular situations: they are supposed to provide a test for 
judging reality and a standard from which to decide, particularly when a particular 
situation makes conflicting concrete demands. Only animals make strict context sensitive 
responses, the superiority of human reason being precisely the ability to abstract from 
concrete situations in order to rank demands made by reality, and also to respond in a 
way that takes into account the predictable evolution of this reality. (Kant would say that, 
unlike animals, human beings are not linked to a single role or pattern of conduct, 
because they can make conjectures, and give themselves law.18) If all is left to 
responsiveness in relationships, the weakest in all societies, the outsiders, the marginal, 
the emigrants, would be the object of little sympathy and attention; it is on the basis of 
general and abstract principles that they are guarantied some rights and benefits.
By requiring that in matters central to justice (and those only) people think for 
themselves, from the standpoint of others. Kant and Rawls do not shift to a transcendent 
point with no contact with reality; rather they insist on the availability and accessibility of 
principles to all, in concrete situations. They require that everyone (for Kant) and all 
behind the veil of ignorance (for Rawls) reason according to principles that others c m  
adopt. That is, to return to our subject matter, they ask that all men reason as if they 
could be in the concrete situation women are in, and that they adopt principles women 
could act upon (not should, or even would), and, clearly, the other way round. They 
therefore devote particular attention to the problems posed by concrete, embedded and 
embodied others.19 At the same time, they assume that people take responsibility for 
their own choices, and that they should be given the necessary sphere of autonomy to 
make those choices. Translated into feminist terms, this means that each female 
individual be given the space and autonomy to make those choices, without a dominant 
male culture making them or precluding some of them for her. It therefore seems that 
neither the concrete descriptions of the different psychological development between 
women and men, nor the deduced superiority of the ethics of care over justice based 
ethics pose a definite challenge to a Kantian or Rawlsian perspective.
1 8 Those considerations start from the notion of negative freedom in Metaphysics o f Morals, op. cit„ 
p. 42: ‘That which can be determined only by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be 
animal choice (arbitrium brutum). Human choice, however, is a capacity for choice that can 
indeed be affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore of itself (apart from an acquired 
aptitude of reason) not pure but can still be determined to action by pure will. Freedom of choice 
is this independence from being determined by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of 
freedom. The positive concept of freedom is that of the capacity of pure reason to be of itself 
practical.’
19 I borrow this expression from Sheyla Benhabib: ‘The Generalised and Concrete Other: The 
Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist theory', in Benhabib and Cornell (eds.), Feminism 




























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists' objections to contract theory.
Before I turn to the second category of feminist critique of the Kantian perspective 
I adopt here, I think necessary to stress that I chose the example of Gilligan’s work 
because of its relative importance in current feminists debates. However, the same 
objections would apply to any conception starting from similar assumptions (clear 
segregation between two types of moral development and ethics, and subsequent 
assignation of some superiority to a female over a male ‘culture’ or conception of life and 
ethics). In addition to what has been said so far, it seems important to stress that the 
‘gyneceist’ conception of feminism does not seem to acknowledge that gender conflicts 
arise in a common culture, shared by women and men, and in the different experiences 
defined by this common culture, an aspect which I will return to latter.
2. Women in the limbo o f  pre-individualist fem inism .
The other objection made by feminist critics to classical and neo-contractarian 
theories is that they do not challenge the family, and leave all the problems of the gender 
division of labour unexamined, defined as beyond the reach of just relations. While the 
public sphere is governed by principles of justice, the private sphere remains the place of 
paternalism and potentially of male tyranny over women’s bodies and lives.
This view is paradigmatically expressed in Carole Pateman’s book on the Sexual 
Contract, presented as a feminist critique of contract theory.20 Carole Pateman claims 
that the health of the public sphere has been said to depend on the exclusion of women by 
17^* and 182*1 century thinkers. Her critical reading of those authors leads her to the 
conclusion that the social contract is a ‘fraternal contract’ which depends on a sexual 
contract made for the purpose of subjugating women. From there she moves to the claim 
that all theories based on the idea of freely contracting individuals must rest on the 
subjection of women, whose inclusion as full members of the contract would render the 
theory incoherent. She therefore sees an ‘incongruous character’ in the alliance between 
feminism and contract. ‘The victory of contract has a considerable appeal for feminists, 
given the long sway of coverture and the various social and legal means still used to deny 
women ownership of property in their persons. The conclusion is easy to draw that the 
denial of civil equality to women means that the feminist aspiration must be to win 
acknowledgement for women as “individuals”. Such an aspiration can never he fulfilled. 
The “individual" is a patriarchal category. The individual is masculine and his sexuality



























































































Feminism  from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists' objections to contract theory.
is understood accordingly the social contract is only a sexual or fraternal contract, a 
contract of brothers for equal access to the female body.
Surprisingly, however, after having left women in a pre-individualist limbo, the 
book does not seem to abandon the idea of women as autonomous citizens as concerns 
the horizon of expectation that a feminist theory should look at. [This is the essential 
problem in Pateman’s and other similar views: it criticises contract theory with a 
vocabulary essential to it, sawing off the branch on which it stands.] In the critical 
review she devoted to Pateman’s Sexual Contract, Susan Okin showed that ‘Pateman 
gives up too easily on the potential uses of contract for feminism.’21 However, Okin, 
who has written an important book to show that Rawls ‘can readily be put to feminist 
uses’22 also gives up rather t'acilely on the validity of classical contract theory, promptly 
jumping to Rawls. This does not prepare her to acknowledge that the three authors 
whose theory of contract Rawls intends to carry to a higher level of abstraction and 
coherence —Locke, Rousseau and Kant— developed the vocabulary which constitutes 
the strength and originality of this tradition.
My position here is that concepts such as liberty, equality, independence and 
autonomy allow contract theory not to have to choose one of the two terms of the false 
dichotomy between community and individual. They give the richest account of the 
person, one which precisely provides the needed means to criticise the classical thinkers 
who elaborated its foundation (and whose work needs to be submitted to inquiry with 
this object). Contract theory carries in itself the resources for its own modification, 
essentially because of its commitment to giving reasons, but also because it 
conceptualises a relationship between individuals and society which presupposes that 
neither is prior to the other. The main originality of social contract literature is that it 
conceives of society as a mutual phenomenon, in which the autonomy of each is essential 
to all, in which the uniqueness of each person is affirmed through a mutual recognition of 
each member by the others.
This is what has constituted the basis of what Carole Pateman sees as a dead-end: 
the claim that women as persons are entitled to the same recognition of rights and liberties 
as men. Pateman as well as Okin, who follows her on this point, affirm the ‘falsity of 
the “add women and stir” method of reading history’.22 The cooking metaphor is
21 Okin, Susan Moller. ‘Feminism, the Individual and Contract Theory’. Ethics. Voi. 100, (April 
1990): pp. 658-669.
2 2 Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender and the Family. New York: Basic Books, 1989.
2 2 Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, op. cit., p. 11.



























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists' objections to contract theory.
however both inadequate and misleading. Removing the basis on which women have 
been denied the consideration of full or ‘active’ citizenship is not equal to seasoning the 
theory with some new spice. It obliges a reappraisal of the inconsistencies and 
historically situated inadequacies of the Social Contract tradition, and reconsiderating of 
institutions such as family, labour structure and education, so that they can be seen to 
give full membership —and not only the vote— to women. But this is done through 
starting from a conception of the person and of just institutions which has been framed in 
contract theory, in its conception of citizens as free and equal and in its commitment to 
‘Lawful freedom, the attribute of obeying no other law than that to which he [she] has 
given his [her] consent; civil equality, that of not recognising among the people any 
superior with the moral capacity to bind him [her] as a matter of Right in a way that he 
[she] could not in turn bind the other; ... and civil independence of owing his [her] 
existence and preservation to his [her] own rights and powers as a member of the 
common wealth, not to the choice of another among the people.’ The echo of those 
words of the Metaphysics o f Morals still resonate in feminist vindication.
Active and passive citizenship.
Let us come back to the texts. How is women’s identity to be conceived in 
contract theory? What are the reasons given for not recognising women as full 
autonomous subjects, as active citizens? What are the conceptual means to be found in 
Kant (and, before him, in Locke and Rousseau) to revise this exclusion? The first 
observation one would make is technical: it is not really the health of the public sphere 
which been said to depend on the exclusion of women by those thinkers, rather it has 
been said to depend on the independence of individuals. Women are excluded, because 
depicted as non independent, in that they are not ‘their own master’. The argument of 
independence, which stems from the idea of alienation, serves to explain what is 
intrinsically unacceptable with slavery, and stresses the idea of liberty: ‘When a man 
renounces his liberty he renounces his essential manhood, his rights, and even his duty 
as a human being.’, says Rousseau.24 The idea is that somebody who is not 
independent cannot have an independent will, and is therefore not a full citizen. 
Rousseau draws in this aspect from Grotius and Pufendorf, but mainly from Locke, and 
the idea of the link between self-legislation and liberty (Second Treatise, § 63: ‘The 
freedom then of man and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his
2 4 Cf. Rousseau, On Social Contract: ‘Renoncer à sa liberté c’est renoncer à sa qualité d’homme, aux 



























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists’ objections to contract theory.
having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and 
make him known how far he is left to the freedom of his own will.’ From this is 
deduced the principle expressed at § 95: Men are ‘by nature free, equal, and 
independent’.) Rousseau and then Kant deepened Locke’s idea and rendered it more 
problematic, by claiming that liberty is acting in accordance with laws we give to 
ourselves, as a political body. It is in this context that Kant’s division between active and 
passive citizen has to be situated.
Kant does exclude women from active citizenship. In the first instance 
unreflectedly, and in the second, basing his argument on the idea of independence. In 
the early essay On the Common saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not 
Apply in Practice' Kant says: ‘The only qualification required by a citizen (apart.. of 
course, from being an adult malel is that he must be his own master (sui iuris), and must 
have some property (which can include any skill, trade, fine art or science).’25 As 
ever, when a philosopher says ‘of course’, we should take it as a clear sign of something 
that has not been analysed properly, and is the expression of unrationalised prejudices. 
Philosophy is the discipline that takes it as its task to show what is not obvious in what 
seems evident, and there is clearly an unphilosophical turn in Kant’s claim that women 
are ‘obviously’ excluded from citizenship.
Kant did in fact come back to this problem latter, in the Metaphysics o f Morals, in 
a way that needs to be analysed more carefully. He writes that the attributes of citizen are 
‘Lawful freedom  ...; civil equality ... and civil independence. From his independence 
follows his civil personality, his attribute of not needing to be represented by another 
where rights are concerned.’ Those are attributes that all, women included, share, but full 
citizenship (voting) can only be given to ‘active citizens’, in contrast with a wide 
category of passive citizen: ‘an apprentice in the service of a merchant or artisan; a 
domestic servant (as distinguished from a civil servant); a minor (naturaliter vel civiliter); 
all women and, in general, anyone whose preservation in existence (his being fed and 
protected) depends not on his management of his own business but on arrangements 
made by another (except the state). All these people lack civil personality and their
2 5 Kant, Immanuel. ‘On the Common saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply 
in Practice’” , in Kant’s Political writings. London: Cambridge University Press, 1971. The idea 
of property has to be understood in this rather large context of ‘skill, trade, fine art or science’ and 
comes directly from Locke (See Second Treatise, § 85: ‘These men ... not capable of any property, 
cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society’). Clearly the problem, from a 
feminist point of view, is precisely to define child-rearing as a skill, and potentially as paid work, 




























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists' objections to contract theory.
existence is, as it were, only inherence.’26 Conscious himself that this distinction 
between active and passive citizens ‘seems to contradict the concept of a citizen as such’ 
Kant wants nonetheless to preserve civil independence from the arbitrary will of 
somebody else. Women ‘in general’ are said to depend for their subsistence on others 
and cannot therefore be considered to have a full civil personality (that is, in Kant’s 
terms, ‘the attribute of not needing to be represented by another where rights are 
concerned’), in the same manner as servants and minors cannot.
There are two sides to Kant’s notion of the independence of women. One is the 
remnant of a prejudice against women, which clearly appears in his first formulation and 
which an analysis of his second statement reveals: some women of his time had a 
personal fortune, did not depend for their subsistence on others, and should, following 
his own reasoning, be given full active citizenship. This prejudice cannot be said to be 
only the effect of a certain time, where certain ideas were inconceivable. Some of Kant’s 
contemporaries were in fact in favour of equal citizenship for men and women. An 
obvious example, close to Kant’s positions on citizenship on other aspects, is the 
Marquis de Condorcet, who wanted to extend ‘to all those who have property, who are 
householders’, and explicitely active citizenship (the ‘droit de cité’) to women as well.27 
But the important theme Kant introduces —important because structural to his argument 
and not to be dismissed as a prejudice unnecessary to the theoretical construct— is that 
people need independence, including material independence for food and subsistence, to 
be ‘their own masters’ and not to be submitted to the arbitrary will of somebody else. 
The submission Kant has in mind is not only material but has effects on people’s capacity 
to think autonomously for themselves. Thus formulated, the argument is not unfamiliar 
to feminists, who have consistently maintained that women who do not have entitlements 
of their own are vulnerable to coercion when conditions do not allow for a consent to 
domination.
We cannot have the criticism both ways: both because the theory is blind to 
subjection (that is: it takes it as obvious), and because it takes it to be a problem to be 
analysed. If my reasoning is correct, the only thing that is missing from Kant’s second 
discussion is not the consciousness of the problem, but rather the will to change it. There
2 6 Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysics o f Morals. Introduction, translation and notes by Mary Gregor. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 125-126. 1 share the translator’s view that 
‘For the most part, it would be philosophically correct throughout Kant's moral philosophy to 
translate tier Mensch as “a human being".' but she keeps the term 'man' instead, to avoid being 
anachronistic (Translator’s note on the text, p. xii).
27 Marquis de Condorcet. 'Sur l’admission des femmes au droit de cité’. Journal de la Société de 




























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists' objections to contract theory.
is therefore definitely something lacking in Kant’s theory, from a feminist point of view, 
but Kant’s notion of independence can on the other hand perfectly be taken as an 
adequate starting point for a certain view of feminism, primarily concerned with the 
conception of women as full and autonomous subjects. The idea of independence, put 
forward by Locke and Rousseau, but given full content by Kant, is in this view an 
essential tool for women who do not want to give up on their ‘civil personality’ and an 
existence which is not ‘only inherence’. More generally, the scope of feminist theory 
should be to examine how political, social and economic institutions should be arranged 
to allow every woman to enjoy lawful freedom, and to obey ‘no other law than that to 
which she has given her consent: civil equality of not recognising among the people any 
superior with the moral capacity to bind her as a matter of right in a way that she could 
not in turn bind the other; and civil independence of owing her existence and preservation 
to her own rights and powers as a member of the common wealth, not to the choice of 
another among the people.’ Feminist theory cannot give up on consent, civil equality and 
civil independence.
I would add here that in this respect, what has just been written could apply to 
Rawls almost as much as it applies to Kant. Rawls’ writings succeed in taking Kant’s 
theory further, by applying to it concerns with toleration and the necessary limits to be 
imposed on the State, which produces the substitution of comprehensive liberalism by 
political liberalism28. But it seems undeniable that Rawls has not set it as one of its 
primary tasks to propose a theory addressing in specific form the problem of women’s 
subjection29, and therefore that while there are useful principles to start from in his 
theory, there is also a need to develop them in a coherent way, showing the concrete 
problems and solutions that the feminist challenge poses.
Kant, women and marriage.
The place identified by Pateman, Okin and many feminist theorists as the locus of 
subjection of women, that is of the denial of lawful freedom, civil equality and 
independence, is the family. A contract applied to the family and therefore opposed to a 
‘fraternal contract’, to an agreement ‘of the brothers for equal access to women’s bodies’
2 8 See III - 2. below for a development of ibis point.
29 In oilier words, in developing his principles of justice in reflective equilibrium. Rawls did not take 





























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists’ objections to contract theory.
(Pateman) is in fact the essential idea expressed in Okin’s Justice, Gender and the 
Family. 30
Part of this conception of a contract applying to the sphere of the family is already 
present in both Locke and Kant. As for Kant, he has an idea of a contract between 
husband and wife which is explicitly mutual, precisely starting from the problem of the 
other’s body. Through marriage, one gives one’s body to the other, but is given exactly 
the same right of access by the other. Through this exchange, one avoids treating 
oneself, or the other, only as a means, and restores its full personality. Kant begins with 
the problem of dealing with one’s body as an object: he describes sexual intercourse as 
‘giving oneself up to the other.’ and adds ‘In this act a human being makes himself into a 
thing, which conflicts with the Right of humanity in his own person.’ As said, the 
recovering of the integrity of the person (not only as means but also as end) is through 
mutuality: ‘There is only one condition under which this is possible: that while one 
person is acquired by the other as if  it were a thing, the one who is acquired acquires the 
other in turn: for in this wav each reclaims itself and restores its personality.’31 (For this 
very reason, polygamy is impossible in Kant’s terms — ‘in polygamy the person who 
surrenders herself gains only a part of the man who gets her completely, and therefore 
makes herself into a mere thing’—, as is prostitution —elegantly called pactum  
fomicationis . I suppose the argument could be extended to any agreement involving the 
commodification of one’s body, against surrogate motherhood, for example.) In the rest 
of his considerations, Kant will speak of partners, and not of man, precisely to make 
absolutely clear this mutuality (which, as we saw, does not however imply, according to 
him, mutuality in the public sphere). Let us add that in this respect he goes further than 
many 19th and even 20th century civil codes —Napoleon’s code is the paradigmatic 
example—  in that he thinks that if there is adultery, this is equally unjustified for both 
man and woman, and also because he stresses the equality of possession not only of each 
other but of material goods (Metaphysics o f Morals. On the Right of Domestic Society. 
§ 26: *[T]he relation of the partners in a marriage is a relation of equality of possession, 
equality both in their possession of each other as persons ... and also equality in their 
possession of material goods.’) There is, however, a limit to this equality: the man, as 
head o f household represents the common interest, from which is derived a ‘right to
30 In this paper I will not address the rest of Okin’s discussion of liberal and communtarian authors 
from a feminist point of view. I share some of her conclusions but the detailed analysis of my 
disagreements with her, especially on her reading of Alasdair MacIntyre, which she describes, I 
believe, wrongly, as a ‘reactionary’ would have to be the object of a separate paper. At any rate, 
Okin does stress, resting on MacIntyre’s ideas, the need of conceiving feminism as a ‘tradition’ 
—in the sense of a living argument—, a point of view to which I would subscribe.




























































































Feminism fro m  a Kantian Perspective. Feminists' objections to contract theory.
direct’. We will see later that Rawls also uses this idea of head of household as the 
representative of others interests —of children, not of the wife—, though he does not 
assume the same argument of authority.
This Kantian idea, which draws on Locke, of a contract between husband and 
wife32 has the virtue of offering an adequate standpoint against the conception, best 
expressed in Rousseau’s Social Contract, and still to be found in many theories and 
practices, that the family is natural that it is the only human institution which is not based 
on conventions. The family, Rousseau says, is ‘the oldest form of society and the only 
natural one’: natural and therefore unquestionable, both in its inherited structure and 
division of roles.33 The line I will develop, hereafter, will be to see what ‘rethinking the 
[natural model of] family’, to borrow Kymlicka’s expression, and more generally 
rethinking the assumptions behind the presentation of individuals as head of household 
imply, from a feminist perspective.
3 2 See Locke’s Second Treatise. Marriage is a ‘compact’ , which can be revised (§ 81) even if ‘The 
society between parents and children ... is far different from a political society.’ Authority 
‘naturally’ falls to the man —the resort to nature is always to justify the status quo— which does 
not mean that he is entitled to absolute authority: § 82: ‘But the husband and wife, though they 
have but one common concern, yet having different understandings [that is: different minds], will 
unavoidably sometimes have different wills too. It therefore being necessary that the last 
determination (i.e., the rule) should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man’s share as 
the abler and the stronger. But -this, reaching but to the things of their common interest and 
property, leave the wife in the full and true possession of what bv contract is her peculiar right, 
and at least gives the husband no more power over her than she has over his life: the power of the 
husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch that the wife has, in many cases, a liberty 
to separate [not granted, on the contrary, by Kant] from him where natural right or their contract 
allows it ... and the children, upon such separation, fall to the father qi mother’s lot as such 
contract does determine.’
33 See On Social Contract, I. 1. Apart from this aspect, the Social Contract provides, from a 
feminist perspective willing to challenge the received views of women’s natural role, an 
understanding of the way in which citizenship is achieved through reason and liberty, in a constant 
opposition to nature. This notion of the self production of human beings as the result of a 
process, through meaningful work, is in effect one of die key elements of the Contract.
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I ll - Individuals, heads of households and the family from 
a feminist perspective.
Before Kant, the basis for morals was sought in the order of nature, in the idea of 
happiness or in divine will. The Copemican turn which Kant makes allows us not to 
ground morality in the determination of nature —here gender division— and to substitute 
the idea of happiness for the notion of autonomy, of self-legislative will. The Kantian 
standpoint is therefore adequate for a feminism which does not want to be relativistic, 
sceptical, or dogmatic.
My claim at the beginning of this paper has been that feminism addresses a 
specific domination. The definite question which must be answered by feminist theory is 
under which conditions women can be considered to have given authentic consent34 to 
institutions in the society, and therefore to enjoy recognition as autonomous members of 
society. Some of the main aspects that specifically limit women’s autonomy are:
L_ The assumptions made by social, economic and political institutions about 
the ‘natural’ structure of the family, and of the roles in it. This is where the 
authentic consent given to one’s role in life as a woman plays a crucial part. It is 
important as a means ‘to enjoy lawful freedom, and to obey no other law than 
that to which she has given her consent’.
2̂ _ The reproduction, through education, of inherited prejudices about 
women’s role in life, which legitimise their subjection. This affects the 
conception of female persons as free and equal human beings, or, in Kantian 
terms, woman’s ‘civil equality of not recognising among the people any superior 
with the moral capacity to bind her as a matter of right in a way that she could not 
in turn bind the other’.
The subsequent problem of independence through paid work: women 
who do not have earnings of their own are exposed to coercion, give their 
consent to domination and cannot enjoy the ‘civil independence of owing her 
existence and preservation to their own rights and powers as members of the 
common wealth, not to the choice of others among the people.’
‘Authentic consent' must be révisable and given in conditions of balanced capacities between 
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4j_ The problem of child-bearing; this aspect is what I have singled as the
insoluble difference between men and women.
I will examine those four points, devoting, however, most attention to the first 
two. The basic assumption that family constitutes the locus of reflection that has to be 
developed is, as I said, an idea I share. However, I would define the need of ‘rethinking 
the family’ as the need to expand and give greater coherence to the Kantian theory of 
autonomy. My contention is therefore that the sense of many feminist cridcisms aimed at 
liberal contract theory can be described as justified complaints because the theory is not 
liberal enough: because, that is, it gives up on the essential idea of the autonomy of 
female as well as male individuals, particularly in the sphere of the family. I shall not 
focus my attention in what follows on Kant’s own conception of the family, of which I 
have already given a short overview. Rather, I will use Rawls’ ideas on the matter as 
expressing one of the most up-to-date elaborations of a theory of justice on a Kantian 
basis, and try to define the areas where political liberalism still needs to develop, in order 
coherently to address the problem of women’s autonomy.
At this point, some would argue that perhaps the title of my essay should be: ‘The 
Idea of Feminism from a Rawlsian Perspective’. In fact, part of what follows works 
with what I find to be one of the most creative tensions in Rawls’ theory, namely, the 
attempt to make compatible the requirements of justice and those of toleration (that is, 
reading Kant through Locke’s eyes). However, an important part of Rawls’ work draws 
on ideas concerning the moral development of children (see chapter VIII of A theory of 
Justice) , which fall outside the Kantian view I want to develop here35. My assumption 
is that by providing what Susan Okin calls ‘an arid rationalist account’, Kant precisely 
allows us to reflect on the institution of the family in such a way as to attach a lesser 
weight to prejudices and traditional models about what children ‘need’, when attempting 
to arrive at moral norms. By separating the two problems, moral learning and the rational 
principles of justice, the imaginative effort which has to be made to think of just 
institutions from the perspective of gender equality is rendered, if not easy, possible. I 
therefore leave to a further stage —and, perhaps, to another discipline than political 
theory— the task of describing children’s development, and will try to address only those
3 5 Rawls himself seems to have recently adopted a simitar position of avoidance of considerations on 
moral psychology. See for instance ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical.’ Philosophy 
and Public Affairs. Vol. 14, n. 3 (Summer 85), note 2, p.224. Rawls emphasises the idea that 
the title of his lectures ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’ ‘was misleading’. He concludes 
by saying that ‘since the conception of justice discussed is a political conception, a better title 
would have been “Kantian Constructivism in Political Philosophy’” .
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of Rawls’ idea of justice and the family which, without being strictly Kantian, do not fall 
outside the Kantian framework.36
Another objection that could be made to my attempt here would be that this task 
has already been developed by Susan Moller Okin in her Justice, Gender, and the 
Family, where she clearly claims to attempt to put Rawls to feminist uses. To put things 
simply, I suppose that I begin where her book finishes. (That is, her book falls short of 
providing concrete/realistic prescriptions for state action.) However, a thorough 
examination and critique of the public/domestic dichotomy does mean that this distinction 
needs to be carefully redefined, in order to answer two basic questions: whether it makes 
sense to keep it, and if so, to what extent and in which spheres. (Which entails indicating 
where privacy and intimacy conceal domination, and what public policies should do to 
modify it.). The fact that what Rawls would call ‘the basic structure’ is not clearly 
defined in Okin’s book has the consequence that she does not show in detail how she 
conceives of ‘liberalising the family’. A liberal attitude from each member of the family 
towards the others would mean that they do not exercise the power they have, through 
either authority or love, and that they respect the fact that others have different ideas of 
the good life, that they might even find evil, and let them act accordingly. This is 
however something that falls out of the reach of political liberalism, which simply cannot 
legislate on love. It also falls outside a Kantian conception of right, and would be left to 
the realm of virtue. A liberal attitude towards other members of the family might at any 
rate be the consequence of a liberal education, but cannot be enforced by the State. It is 
not possible, if we want to keep the coherence of the rest of Rawls’ theory, to just ‘add 
family and stir’ —to retake the metaphor that Okin borrows from Dale Spender. This is 
so, not because women’s subjection is essential to the coherence of A Theory o f Justice, 
but because it is impossible in the frame of Rawls’ political liberalism to think of a state 
which would require that the values of autonomy and individuality govern all aspects of 
family life and children’s education. Accordingly, Okin does not really go very far in her 
analysis of how the model of ‘liberal’ family she wants would work. This has been quite 
thoroughly analysed by Will Kymlicka, who writes: ‘Okin has shown that justice in the 
family must be put at the centre of a theory of sexual equality. ... But the issue of family 
justice opens up a host of questions that she seems reluctant to discuss. The overall 
impression she gives is that child-rearing in a just society will be done within traditional 
groupings —monogamous heterosexual couples. ... But to assume that justice requires
3 6 For a detailed and critical discussion of the differences and analogies between a Kantian and a 
Rawlsian perspective, see HOffe, Otfried: ‘Dans quelle mesure la théorie de John Rawls est-elle 
kantienne?', in Individu et justice social. Autour de John Rawls . Paris: Seuil, 1988, pp. 54-72 
See also O'Neill, Onora. ‘Constructivism in ethics’, in Constructions o f Reason. Explorations o f 
Kant’s practical philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 206-218.
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fairness between ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’ in the raising of ‘their’ children is to have 
already assumed much of what a theory of family justice needs to determine. Indeed, it is 
to assume too much of the old ideology of the natural family that Okin herself wishes to 
defeat.’37
One of the questions which is consequently insufficiently developed in Susan 
Okin’s book concerns the problem of a contract applied to children. There can be 
discussions as to when the ‘age of reason’, or ‘age of discretion’ (Locke38), or age of 
mastering ‘the use of one’s members and understanding’ (Kant39) commences. It is 
however obvious that the age of reason does not begin at birth. Therefore, children 
cannot be said to have, either really or ideally, ‘signed’ a contract with their parents. 
(Even though Rawls is willing to consider the family, through contractarian eyes, as ‘a 
small association, normally characterised by a definite hierarchy, in which each member 
has certain rights and duties.’40) Children have, in Kantian terms, for some time no 
‘civil personality’, in that they lack the attribute of not needing to be represented by 
another where rights are concerned. This obliges a consideration as to how far parents 
can represent their children’s interest, for how long, and how the choices they make can 
be revised by their children when ‘they come of age’.
There are also aspects where I disagree with Okin’s theory, mainly her idea of a 
‘genderless society’ (p. 171: ‘A just future would be one without gender’). This 
expression, as she formulates it, suggests a line of progressive emancipation of women 
which could sound both utopian —gender is not going to disappear— and as peremptory 
as ‘challenging the public/private distinction’. The idea is counter intuitive, because 
many people neither want it nor believe in its possibility, and authoritarian —since surely 
some women want to retain different attitudes to men, and define themselves in a
3 7 Kymlicka, Will. ‘Rethinking the Family.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 20, n. 1 (Winter 
1991): pp. 96-97. For a different critical perpsective on Okin’s book see also Joshua Cohen. 
"Okin on Justice, Gender, and Family". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol 22. n. 2, June 
1992, pp. 263-286.
3 8 See Second Treatise, § 64 and following. The authority of the father (and of the mother: ‘in his 
power the mother, too, has her share with the father.’) stops when children arrive at adulthood. § 
86: ‘[T]he master of the family has a very distinct and differendy limited power both as to time 
and extent over those several persons that are in i t ; ... he has no legislative power of life and death 
over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. ... And 
he certainly can have no absolute power over die whole family who has but a very limited one 
over every individual in it.’, and § 118: Children are under their father’s authority till they come to 
‘age of discretion’; then they choose ‘at liberty’, what government diey will put themselves under.
3 9 For Kant there is, from that moment on, no duly of right for the children to obey the parents, but
only a duty of virtue, to feel gratitude towards them.)
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traditional way. (This Okin would not deny. But then she cannot claim that the future is 
of a ‘genderless’ society). In Rawlsian terms it would be difficult to adopt principles 
leading to a genderless society behind the veil of ignorance, because it would not express 
a ‘reflective equilibrium’ —that is reasonable conditions and principles which match ‘our 
considered judgements duly pruned and adjusted’.41
This is the reason why, rather than a genderless society, I prefer the much 
dismissed idea of a gender-neutral society —that is not a society where genders disappear 
but a society where the principal of abstract equality is applied when thinking of gender in 
public policy. Many feminists (Catharine MacKinnon and Susan Okin, for example) 
argue against the gender-neutral way of looking at the problem of equality of 
opportunities. On this view, which is shared by Will Kymlicka in his lastest book42, 
almost all important roles and positions have been structured in gender-biased ways, so 
that women participate in a race which they have already lost, a reality which the gender- 
neutral discourse on equal opportunities veils. One way of understanding the 
implications of the inefficiency of the gender-neutral discourse underlined among others 
by Okin and Kymlicka is that it legitimises unfair socially built differences, by 
naturalising them. (This is the same logic of reasoning adopted by Bourdieu in his book 
La Distinction: different legitimacy attributed to ways of dressing, speaking, and to tastes 
in general tend to ‘naturalise’ class division.43) In effect, women are made to believe 
that they do worse in fair professional competition, on the basis of their inferior talents or 
commitments to it. They enter the race as severely handicapped both by the way they 
have been socialised so far, and by the social consideration of their labour as secondary 
to their self-realisation in life. This line of reasoning 1 find sociologically convincing as a
4 1 I suppose this justifies Rawl’s words in 77., p. 99: ‘As far as possible ... justice as fairness 
appraises die social system from the position of equal citizenship and the various levels of income 
and wealth. Sometimes, however, other positions may need to be taken into account. If, for 
example, there are unequal basic rights founded on fixed natural characteristics, these inequalities 
will single out relevant positions. Since dtese characteristics cannot be changed, the nositions 
lll£y define count as starling places in the basic structure. Distinctions based on sex are of this 
tvne. and so are those depending upon race and culture. Thus if, say, men are favoured in the 
assignment of basic rights, this inequality is justified by the difference principle (in the general 
interpretation) only if it is to the advantage of women and accentable from their standpoint. ... On 
the other hand, these inequalities are seldom, if ever, to the advantage of the less favoured, and 
therefore in a just society the smaller number of relevant positions should ordinarily suffice.' The 
paragraph is however confusing in more way Uian one, essentially because it begins with fixed 
natural characteristics but mentions culture in the course of the argument, and also because Rawls 
does not sufficiently define the ‘smaller number of relevant positions’ he is willing to grant, from 
the point of view of ‘unequal rights founded on fixed natural characteristics'. It would seem 
enough to say that each party, behind the veil of ignorance, knows that there is a reasonable 
chance she/he will be a parent.
4 2 Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy, op. cit., chapter 7.
4 3 Bourdieu, Pierre: La Distinction. Critique Sociale du Jugement. Paris: Minuit, 1984.



























































































description of the social mechanisms of legitimation and reproduction of inequalities. 
However, the conclusion which seems logically to follow from it is not that gender- 
neutral principles are pointless, but rather that they have to be applied more consistently, 
for example when rethinking the socialisation of children of both genders. (This applies 
essentially to education.)
I will hereafter develop those lines of argument, turning first to the problem of 
head of households in liberal theory at large, to see whether a certain idea of the family 
has to be kept and if so, what a non nature-based definition of it would be; I then will 
deduce the concrete aspects that a liberal feminist idea of education should address, with 
some final considerations on labour and child-bearing.
Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Individuals, heads o f households and the fam ily .
1. A different idea of the family and of the Rawlsian head of household.
Many feminists have argued that, following traditional thought, Rawls preempts 
the question of intra-familial justice. He does so in two ways: one is by assuming a 
family structure which secures identity of interests between distinct individuals. 
Secondly, even if there is no crude statement in Rawls saying that heads of family are 
male, the presumption of a sexual division of labour does indeed underpin his conception 
of the family. That is; Rawls has not revised Kant’s view of identity of interest between 
wife and husband, and the subsequent division of gender roles.
The conception of individuals as heads of households is introduced by Rawls as a 
device for people behind the veil of ignorance to care about their successors —so that 
they can represent a kind of everlasting moral agent; ‘[The] good will [of the parties] 
stretches over at least two generations. Thus representatives from periods adjacent in 
time have overlapping interests. For example we may think of the parties as heads of 
families and therefore as having a desire to further the welfare of their nearest 
descendants. It is not necessary to think of the parties as heads of families, although I 
shall generally follow this interpretation. What is essential is that each person in the 
original position should care about the well-being of some of the next generation, it being 
presumed that their concern is for different individuals in each case.’44
4 4 Rawls, John. 77., pp. 128-129; my emphasis. I suppose, however, that the expression ‘Head of 
households’, which is retaken from Locke and Kant, in whom it serves to describe the duties of the 
[male] person in charge of an extended family, including adult children and servants, is not exactly 
adequate as a description of what Rawls is thinking. (See esp. Metaphysics o f Morals, op. cit., p. 
100-101, Right of Head of Household: ‘[A] society under the head o f the household (societas 
herelis) [is] formed by a contract through which the head of the household establishes a domestic
Footnote continues on next pope.
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The first thing that should be observed here is that this view does not depend on 
the family as an institution, and less as a just institution. Very shortly afterwards, when 
listing the elements of the initial situation and their variation, Rawls defines the parties as 
‘continuing persons (family heads, or genetic lines)’.45 Finally, when considering the 
morality of authority, the idea of questioning the institution of the family is clearly 
expressed, though not developed: ‘I shall assume that the basic structure of a well- 
ordered society includes the family in some form, and therefore that children are at first 
subject to the legitimate authority of their parents. Of course, in a broader inquiry the 
institution of the family might he questioned, and other arrangements might indeed prove 
to he preferable.*46
Nothing in the idea that individuals behind the veil of ignorance should care about 
future generations precludes changes —and indeed radical changes— in the institution of 
the family. On the other hand, the necessity of this notion seems clear: it is important not 
to have ‘egotistical generational choices’ (perhaps the right of children to have a clean 
environment would be a good example, in this context). Secondly, as no assumption is 
made either about the gendered nature of child-rearing, the true problem here is whether 
there can be an identity of interest between parents and children.
However, Rawls takes two positions here: /. He speaks of heads of family 
‘caring for the well-being of some in the next generation’ (that is: caring for children’s 
interests when they are beyond the ‘age of reason’); here the definition of children’s 
interests falls entirely on the adults' side. 2. But Rawls does also inuoduce the idea that 
the interest of representatives from periods adjacent in time should ‘overlap’ (see 
quotation above). Clearly here, the idea of conflict between interests is taken further, and 
as in the rest of the theory, the idea is to find an institution which could be justified to 
people of both generations, whose ideas of the good can be conflicting and indeed 
incommensurable (as would, for example, the idea of the good life of a liberal girl 
brought-up in a very traditional and religious family conflict with those of her parents). 
Those two aspects could be seen as appearing chronologically, in children’s 
development.
Working with the idea of ‘Heads of households’ therefore poses two problems: 
firstly, how justified it is that some represent others’ interests in matters concerning
society with the children who have now attained their majority ... Servants are included in what 
belongs to the head of household.’)
4 5 Rawls, John. 77., pp. 145-146. The idea of ‘continuing persons' is interesting, and could serve 
to define the duties towards the previous generation (pensions) as well as the following.
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justice; secondly how it is that the revision of choices which have been made for the
represented when they were ‘beyond the age of reason’ is rendered possible. To see
exactly what has to be reconsidered in the theory, we can adopt several lines of criticism.
1 . It is not true that the heads of households are only men. Most contemporary 
liberals would not be bothered by this view, and this seems to be the case with 
Rawls. However some contract theory authors have denied this premise (see 
above). As to Rawls, as I said, it does not seem that the problem of gender 
domination has been a priority for him. He does not address this problem 
specifically, but he also sometimes writes as if he did in fact make assumptions 
about the gendered nature of heads of families.47 We can see those cases and the 
fact that he writes using the generic ‘he’ for both women and men as semantic 
usages that do not affect the body of his view of a just society. However, it is 
important to ask of the theory that it make clear the minimum assumption that men 
are not heads of households, because this has substantial consequences. The first 
and most important is that the state should not assume that the child carer is a 
woman. This has the logical consequence that adequate institutional measures and 
procedures should be adopted that avoid making the child-carer pay a heavy price 
in terms of life opportunities. (In other words that both men and women can 
choose to be co-heads of households, with a set of feasible roles opened to them). 
It therefore presupposes that all adults in a ‘family-structure’ are to be considered 
as co-head of households (that is: adults behind the veil of ignorance can only 
represent the interests of the children of the following generation, but not each 
other’s interest, because both have reached the ‘age of reason’).
2. It is not true that individuals are head of households. I suppose that this second 
view goes beyond feminism, even if some feminists are willing to adopt i t  It can 
in turn be divided into two positions:
fiL It is not true that individuals should be considered as heads of households, 
because children are to be considered as individuals, in that they are potential 
adults. The space to develop their own judgement and choices must be protected 
against their parents. The feminist side of it is, as I said, the protection of the 
space and resources of girls to develop as full adults, in equality of conditions at 
the age of adulthood with the males of their generation. The concern of feminism 
would be that children of both sexes be brought up in a non gender coded (and
47 See 77., pp. 208-209, on interests between generations: ‘[W]cre a father, for example, to assert 
that he would accept the principle of equal liberty, a son could not object that were he (the father) 
to do so he would be neglecting his (the son’s) interest.’
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structured) way, with the common availability of symbolic resources, and the 
possibility, for both girls and boys, of revising their parents choices, at a similar 
cost.
bj. It is not true that households are to count as the basic unit, because the 
family should disappear as an institution. Again, this is not a specifically 
feminist dream.
I will examine the concrete aspects that a feminist position from a Kantian 
perspective involves, taking into consideration 1 and 2a. That is, I will see what it 
means to have institutions justifiable to both men and women in that no assumptions are 
made as to who is the primary carer, that they consider both men and women in charge of 
children as ‘heads of households’ ( / ), and that they give sufficient resources and space 
for young girls (and boys) to revise the choices made in good faith by their parents (2a ). 
This will make it necessary to consider the tension between the requirements of 
distributive justice made by gender equality and those of toleration of different ideas of 
the good life, and therefore of the “good education” to be given to children.
Before going into this possibility, however, I will explain why I do not take into 
consideration here the desirability of the abolition of the family (2b, above). It is not an 
unjustified thought to imagine the dissolution of the family as a necessary condition of 
having a truly gender-equal society. This implication is drawn, for example, in Philippe 
Van Parijs’ thorough study of the basic features of a just society, in his examination of 
contemporary Anglo-american philosophical debate (Qu ’est-ce qu 'une société juste ?). In 
the book, in which the problem of justice from the perspective of gender equality is not 
specifically addressed (and, virtually, not mentioned), we find the idea, dropped in 
passing, that ‘real equality of access to privileged positions and functions would 
ultimately require the abolition of the family.’48 The author uses this argument not to 
argue in favour of the abolition of the family; on the contrary, he presents without further 
explanation the implication of the abolition of the family as evil enough to justify that we 
should renounce the desire for real equality of access to privileged positions and 
functions. His sentence deserves further scrutiny.
The inquiry can be conducted by opposing two ideal-types of institutions for the 
bringing-up of children. On the one hand, we can think of state or societal institutions in 
which the parental link with children is completely absent, and substituted by 
bureaucratic, impersonal procedures, which give exactly equal education to all children.
Van Parijs, Philippe. Qu ’est-ce qu ’une société juste? Introduction à la pratique de la philosophie 
politique. Paris: Seuil, 1991, p. 90. My translation.
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On the other hand, what we will call ‘fam ily  ’, by which we will only mean that a 
parental link of some sort, whether biological or through adoption, still exists. Notice 
that thus defined, the range of models for ‘family’ structures is very wide, from 
absolutely traditional models to more ‘imaginative’ ones. The definition which has been 
given does not make assumptions about any ‘natural’, and therefore unchallengeable 
feature of the family, as to its structure, composition and distribution of roles. What is a 
constant though, and constitutes the essential difference with the first model, is that 
‘parents’, of whatever kind, still have a sphere of autonomous definition for the bringing- 
up of ‘their children’, with no more state intervention than the limits imposed by child 
abuse and obligatory education.
Once these two ideal-types for raising children have been defined, the reasons for 
opting for the first model —that is: for radically dissolving the family— or for the second 
(keeping a certain sphere of autonomous definition of children’s education for parents) 
can be analysed as follows. The desirability of the first model from a gender equality 
point of view rests on the fact that family has traditionally been a sphere where women 
were supposed to devote their life, efforts, energy and resources to others, their children 
and husband merely, and that this model still has considerable weight, including many 
unspoken assumptions and prejudices, at both the cultural and institutional level. Besides 
the naturalisation of domination (women are naturally destined to this role) only a narrow 
utilitarian argument (i.e. average utility maximisation) could justify the perpetuation of 
this state of affairs, by saying that women might be sacrificed in families, but that the 
average well-being of society is higher than when this institution is challenged. I 
therefore take it that women’s subjection inside the family is neither justified nor 
reasonable.
There are however compelling reasons for wanting to retain a certain idea of the 
family. The first and decisive one is that the complete elimination of the family can only 
be achieved through a very authoritarian state: most people want to bring up their children 
and keep a certain capacity to decide about aspects of the education they give to them, a 
sphere where the state does not intervene. The second reason is that the traditional 
sacrifice of women in the sphere of the family can be challenged, putting into question the 
inherited roles and structures attributed to it, without putting an end to the actual idea of 
giving adults the possibility of defining autonomously, within the bounds of reason, how 
they want to educate ‘their’ children. This is precisely the minimum basis on which the 
family has been defined in the second ideal-type.
Apart form the two arguments already given, there seem to be positive reasons for 
prefering this second model, as the basis of reflection from which to start for the task of 




























































































Feminism from  a Kantian Perspective. Individuals, heads o f households and the fam ily .
where stories are told about previous generations, traditions and beliefs, their continuities 
and discontinuities, that give some individual roots to children. Children are not only 
treated as abstract persons, in the family, but also as actual individuals, who are loved 
and cared for in a specific way, because they have a special, concrete link with the adults 
who represent the previous generation in their family, which therefore specifically 
situates them at a certain social-historical place. This has the effect that children are given 
unequal resources, depending on what their family is; it also implies that the stories told 
carry their weight of prejudices legitimising an unequal repartition of power between 
genders. However, what we know (practically and theoretically) about impersonal 
institutions, and the effects that failure of treating them as particular persons have on 
children’s development, justifies the application, in this case, of the Rawlsian difference 
principle. That is, the retaining of some form of family-institution, defined as a space 
where adults can have a certain autonomy in giving what they consider the best possible 
education to their children, with all the inequalities this implies as to the distribution of 
material and symbolic resources between families, including different self-understanding 
given to people of the two genders, is preferable to absolute or imposed equality. In 
effect, children brought up without the degree of individuality and of continuities which 
are given by traditions that families provide, children, that is, who grow up in 
bureaucratic impersonal institutions, are worse off, generally speaking, in ail aspects of 
development, than the least favoured of children brought up in families. For this reason, 
the inequalities tolerated between different kinds of up-bringing in families can be said to 
be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
In what follows, I will therefore accept the necessity of thinking of the basic 
institutions of society as having to make compatible the family, as defined before, with 
arrangements that render feasible the possibility that women have real equal access to all 
the primary goods men have, and in the same degree.
Accordingly, the conception of feminism I am putting forward does not imply the 
dissolution of the family-institution, both for reasons of justice given above (the non 
desirability of its substitution because the inequalities it generates between people are, 
compared to the consequences of impersonal up-bringing in bureaucratic institutions, to 
the advantage of the least well-off in society), and because it would inevitably have the 
authoritarian effect of not respecting the desire that a considerable part of society have of 
not losing a certain idea of the family. Besides, it seems that if people were completely 
severed from the up-bringing of their own (adopted or genetic) children, to which they 
would not be able to give an education in great part chosen by them, without the 
interference of the state, this would have the effect of dramatically diminishing the desire 
to have children. One of the most powerful reasons for making the sacrifices that having 
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traditions, family-stories, beliefs and resources of all sorts to one’s children. To purpose 
the complete disappearance of the family does therefore seem undesirable. On the other 
hand, however, the possibility of a drastic redefinition of the inherited and ‘naturalised’ 
models of family still prevailing is necessary from the point of view of feminism: this 
was the aim of the non-nature based definition given previously.
As said, the benefit of the minimum definition of the family as a space where 
adults can have a certain autonomy to give what they consider the best possible education 
to children of the following generation (with the normal guarantees that their health and 
needs are secured), is that it allows for the diversification of models of family, without 
imposing authoritarian changes to people who hold a traditional view of it. If the state 
stops unreflectedly imposing the ideology of the ‘natural family’ (father, mother and their 
biological children), this opens an institutional space for the redefinition of parenthood, 
as concerns its composition and structure. The diversification thus allowed would result 
in seeing the traditional ‘natural’ model of family, with its hierarchy and division of 
labour, as one among different possible choices, depending on one’s idea of the good 
life, and more generally monogamous heterosexual couples as one of the possible models 
of groupings for the bringing-up of children. In time, this would alter the stereotyped 
roles attributed in family —and hence in society at large— to men and women. In effect, 
those stereotypes would be exposed to a range of possible options, allowing for 
comparisons and the adoption of alternatives.
The definition of the family adopted here entails a drastic reconsideration of the 
legal conception of marriage and family: we still live in states that somehow work with a 
combination of Kant’s idea that marriage is ‘the union of two persons of different sexes 
for ... possession of each other’s sexual attributes’ and of Rousseau’s contention that the 
family is a natural institution (with a certain natural structure and hierarchy). If liberal, 
the state should be neutral, starting from the idea of separation between public and 
private, as to the structure of parental groupings, be it a man and a woman, a man and a 
woman of which neither is a parent of the child, two women, two men, etc., as long as 
the health and basic needs of children are secured. This imposes a revision of adoption 
methods, so as to avoid the projection of an even more stereotyped model of a ‘normal 
couple’ candidate as adoptive parents. The only condition stipulated as to who has the 
right to form a family, be it by direct genetic parenting or by adoption, should be the 
ability to provide a reasonable minimum standard of living, over a period of time 
equivalent to the child’s period of growth. One of the advantages of this lifting of limits 
to parenting and adoption would be that the need to decide whether or not they have 
natural progeny, and the necessary concessions in terms of career, would not play such a 
heavy role in women’s life. (I come back to this aspect later.)
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This position can be described as an authentically liberal position concerning the 
state and conceptions of the good family that people hold true. It gives a standpoint for 
both women and men to judge and adopt what they find the best model of parenting. In 
that context, the choice of traditional ‘feminine’ roles could be described as genuine, and 
not as the inevitable result of alienation. In effect, provided they have been given, 
through education, the knowledge that revising their parents’, their family’s, their 
community’s choices is possible and does not constitute a social crime, women who 
choose to devote themselves to tasks traditionally considered ‘feminine’, including child- 
rearing, could be seen as the result of genuine consent. Because they would have been 
allowed the capacity to dissent, their consent could be regarded as morally significant, 
and therefore not be described as the result of oppression or domination alone.
However, this poses the problem of the requirements that the state can impose on 
parents in terms of children’s education, so that the space for young girls and boys to 
develop a certain capacity to dissent is protected, and their adhesion to a certain way of 
life identical to their parents’ cannot be described as coming from mere ignorance, a 
problem which I have already described (see 2.a. above) and which I will examine in 
more detail in the following section.
2. Education. School as an agnostic place fo r  the public use o f  reason.
Some parents disapprove entirely of the values of autonomy and individuality on 
which the idea of genuine consent and capacity to dissent (on which my version of 
feminism is based) are grounded. They would therefore protect their children, sometimes 
especially their girls, from educational influences oriented to giving them a minimum idea 
of those concepts and values. Moreover, some would think that any attempt to make 
such concepts accessible to their children is equivalent to aggression, because it threatens 
the very survival of the culture to which they belong, by posing a core challenge to its 
essential values.
We touch here on the limits imposed by the state on the sphere of autonomy given 
to parents to define the education they want to give to their children (that is: where their 
sphere of autonomy conflicts with the development of the potential autonomy of 
children). Inseparably, this poses the question of the limits that an idea of justice which 
does not want to loose sight of the requirements of toleration of different and conflicting 
ideas of the good, would have to impose on state action directed at meeting the 
requirements of justice. (The requirements of justice are here identified with the capacity 
of autonomy for girls, and with their benefiting from the Rawlsian difference principle of 
equal distribution of liberty and opportunity, bases of self-respect and power and income.
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unless it is to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged —here women haired both from 
education and wage earning, women whose material independence and independent 
judgement are both under threat).
We have seen that there are good reasons to keep a space where parents —or 
parental groupings— can define autonomously the kind of education they want to give to 
their children. In some closed communities, in which one of the essential values is the 
rejection of concepts such as autonomy and individual choice, this space could be used to 
shut a tight circle around children, brought up according to the idea that the rejection or 
even the mere divergence from principles transmitted in a univocal manner constitutes a 
sin. The perpetuation of those principles by members of the following generation could 
therefore not be described as the effect of genuine consent, because it would come from 
ignorance concerning other ways of life that exist and are indeed legitimate in society at 
large. In other words, perpetuation of certain practices would come from the absence of 
knowledge that it is possible to cease believing in one’s parents principles without losing 
one’s place in society. It would not be the result of autonomous reasoning, but rather of 
the heteronomous imposition of a certain idea of the good. The ability to dissent, the 
capacity to leave, through knowledge that this is an option and that a person can be 
rejected by her or his original community and family and yet be a full member of society 
has therefore to be protected. This question goes beyond feminism but, when traditional 
views of feminine and masculine roles form part of the views of communities of this sort, 
which is generally the case, gender equality considerations have to be made. This is 
especially so as the price which has to be paid by girls and boys for dissenting is often 
different, because access to education has been given to the latter rather than to the 
former, who therefore lack not only the ideological but also the cultural resources to re­
integrate themselves into society at large. Securing mainly a ‘right to leave’ when arrived 
at the age of reason is not enough: physical possibility to leave must be complemented by 
a conceptual ability to conceive it as an option, and by the resources not to pay a 
discouraging price for doing so.
In Kantian terms, there are two types of ungenuine consent, which do not give 
legitimacy to the arrangements which spring from them, and are to be considered 
unreasonable. Firstly, an unrevisable consent, a consent for ever, with no possibility of 
dissent or revision at a future point. Secondly, consent arising from what Onora O’Neill 
has called 'impaired capacities to consent.’ (This can also be phrased in terms of 
impaired capacities to dissent.). Education must therefore aim at securing that the equal 
capacity to give a revisable genuine consent exist for girls of all backgrounds, when they 
come of age. The consequences of this, as O’Neill shows, when others —women— are 
not treated as persons, when their autonomy is jeopardised, are twofold: the victims
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cannot agree, nor share the coercers’ end, even in the case in which it is probable that 
they would have chosen the same outcome through a genuine autonomous process.49
If we start from a Kantian idea of the person as free, equal, and able to act 
reasonably and rationally, that is, from a conception of autonomy and responsibility 
which implies that both women and men have full civil personality as to their rights and 
duties with regard to the basic institutions of society, we need to enable persons to have 
the required knowledge to do so. The notion of autonomy, which means that human 
reasoning be not subject to alien or heteronomous authorities, presupposes that people 
can guide their actions through the use of their understanding, and that they can reach 
reasonable judgement, through both individual reflection and public deliberation, on the 
basis of knowledge. However, this knowledge can, as said, be seen in itself, without 
any further state action, as a threat not only to the values of certain communities, but also 
to their very survival. A religious grouping which has meaningfully reproduced itself but 
sees its essential believes as menaced by the modern world, cannot contemplate any 
attempt to give to its children a minimum understanding of basic rights and liberties, and 
of their effects on the space given to persons to develop their own judgement. This 
would be seen as an imposition of a certain idea of the good, identified with the priority 
of right, on to others. This question has led to well known criticism of liberalism as 
sectarian, as trying to present itself as a mere reflection on the instrumental compatibility 
of incommensurable conceptions of the good, while holding a hidden conviction of the 
superiority of its own conception of the good.
This tension is central to John Rawls’ work, especially in his recent articles, in 
which he has tried to avoid a ‘metaphysical’ view of the person, by stressing that ‘The 
search for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted in our conception of 
ourselves and in our relation to society replaces the search for moral truth interpreted as 
fixed by a prior and independent order of objects and relations, whether natural or divine, 
an order apart and distinct from how we conceive of ourselves. ... What justifies a 
conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its 
congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our 
realisation that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the 
most reasonable doctrine for us.’50
4 9
5 o
O’Neill, Onora. ‘between consenting adults.’ Constructions o f reason, op. cit., p. 109.
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The difficulty with this position, even if limited to modern liberal societies (as 
Rawls’ recent articles do) is that the concern with the toleration of other conceptions of 
the good seems to lead to relativism, in what some have seen as a ‘communitarian’ 
reading by Rawls of his own Theory o f Justice. In the problem we are here considering 
—the intervention of the state in children’s education to secure a minimum knowledge 
that gives them an actual and not only a theoretical possession of their rights and liberties 
when they come of age— the difficulty of finding a secure philosophical starting point is 
acknowledged by John Rawls in an important passage of a ‘The Priority of Right and 
Ideas of the Good’:
‘[V]arious religious sects oppose the culture o f the modern world and wish to 
lead their common life apart from its foreign influences. A problem then arises 
about their children’s education and the requirements the state can impose. The 
liberalism o f Kant and Mill has led to requirements designed to foster the values 
o f autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much i f  not all o f life. But 
political liberalism has a different aim and requires fa r less. It will ask that 
children's education include such things as knowledge o f their constitutional and 
civic rights, so that, fo r example, they know that liberty o f conscience exists in 
their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to ensure that their 
continued membership in a religious sect when they come o f age is not based 
simply on ignorance o f their basic rights or fear o f punishment for offences that 
do not exist. Moreover, their education should also prepare them to he fully co­
operating members o f society and enable them to be self-supporting: it should 
also encourage the, political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms o f 
social cooperation in their relations with the rest o f society. Here it may he 
objected that requiring children to understand the political conception in these 
wavs is in effect, though not in intention, to educate them to a comprehensive 
liberal conception. Doing the one may lead to the other, i f  only because once we 
know the one we may o f our own accord go on to the other. It must be granted 
that this may indeed happen in the case o f some. And certainly there is some 
resemblance between the values o f political liberalism and the values o f the 
comprehensive liberalism o f Kant and Mill [Rawls adds in a footnote ‘And that o f 
Raz in The Morality o f Freedom']. But the only way this objection can be 
answered is to set out carefully the great differences in both scope and generality 
between political and comprehensive liberalism. The unavoidable consequences 
o f reasonable requirements for children’s education may have to be accepted, 
often with regret. A fu ll account o f political liberalism itself must provide a 
sufficient reply to the objection. ’ 51
The definition of what reasonable requirements for a child’s education are seems 
to be the appropriate starting point for a reply to those objections. Here the problem is to 
make the entitlement to educational resources of all children —boys and girls— 
compatible with the toleration of different conceptions of what ‘reasonable requirement’ 
for children’s education demands.
Rawls, John. 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good’. Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 
17, n. 4 (Fall 1988): pp. 267-268.
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The first aspect which has to be emphasised is that Rawls does not fully apply the 
important Kantian distinction between virtue and right52, which has already been used 
here. The object of Kant’s Doctrine of Right is to define the characteristics of right so that 
they pose the conditions o f possibility for the coexistence of free human beings: they do 
not require that those be virtuous. They define, that is, the conditions in which external 
constraints are imposed so that this coexistence is possible, but not the self-constraints in 
accordance with moral laws. Accordingly, the Introduction to the Metaphysics o f Morals 
distinguishes between legality and morality: ‘In contrast to laws of nature, ... laws of 
freedom are called moral laws. As directed merely to external actions and their 
conformity to law they are called juridical laws; but if they also require that they (the 
laws) themselves be the determining ground of actions, they are ethical laws, and then 
one says that conformity with juridical laws is the legality of an action and conformity 
with ethical laws is its morality ,’53 Clearly, Rawls’ project is oriented towards the 
conditions of possible coexistence rather than to a doctrine of virtue, but this is defined in 
terms of the compatibility of the same entitlements for all rather than in terms of external 
constraints and of obligations, as the formulation of the main principles suggests (equal 
rights, basic liberties compatible with like liberty for all, and the arrangement of social 
and economic inequalities to the greatest benefit of all).54 This therefore situates his 
project on uncertain ground, apparently limited to Kant’s doctrine of Right but without a 
clear definition of the consU'aints imposed, so that those principles be effective.
In the case that occupies us, the constraints imposed on parents, whatever their 
beliefs and background, by a state in which arrangements start from an idea of justice 
based on a Kantian conception of the person has to guarantee the development of children 
as independent persons, so that a standard be provided for distinguishing genuine from 
forced consent. Moreover, it has to avoid the ‘naturalisation’ of the relation of 
domination described above, and guarantee that the cultural capital given to girls and 
boys, their self image, self esteem and abstract knowledge be as equal as possible. 
Public education must therefore compensate for the unequal distribution of resources of 
this kind which take places in families. However, in a morally pluralistic society, if we 
do not want to adopt what Joshua Cohen has called a ‘rationalist fundamentalist’
5 2 Otfried Hoffe even claims that this distinction is absent from 77.: ‘Rawls does not adopt... the 
evident distinction between right and virtue. For that reason, his principles of justice are visibly 
categorical imperatives, but their character of juridical categorical imperatives is not so evident.' 
(Hoffe, Otfried, op. cit., p. 66, my translation).
53 Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysics o f Morals, op. cit., p. 42.
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position55, we need to clearly limit those constraints, so as not to slip to the ground of 
virtue, and to make through state power a certain idea of justice coincident with absolute 
truth. This is the meaning of Rawls’ attempt: not to convert liberalism into a new state 
religion. This means the adoption of only minimal reasonable requirements in education. 
For example, those minimum requirements have to preserve what has been defined here 
as an autonomous space for parents, or parental groupings, to define, to a great extent, 
the content of the education given to children they are in charge of.
What are those ‘reasonable requirements’ according to Rawls? The quote given 
above does not suggest that they are so minimal. In effect, next to conditions such as the 
knowledge of rights and liberties, education should according to him prepare children to 
be ‘fully co-operating members of society’ and enable them to be ‘self-supporting’ 
[which carries the echo of Kant’s words on active citizens not having to depend for food 
or subsistence on others]; moreover, it should encourage ‘political virtues’ so that 
children, once citizens ‘want to honour the fair terms of social cooperation in their 
relations with the rest of society.’
The encouragement of political virtue goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, the active knowledge of rights and liberties, a minimum idea of their own 
person as members of society and of independence, both symbolic and material (so that 
people are ‘self-supporting’ conceptually and in fact), seems to be the minimum 
resources that young girls, as well as young boys, should receive from education, in 
order to be active citizens, with full civil personality, able to give genuine consent to the 
arrangements that govern their life. By genuine consent we understand here not the fact 
that those arrangements are chosen in the world of pure reason, without any social or 
cultural determination, but that they could have been refused or conceived in a different 
way. Genuine consent presupposes the possibility (but not probability) of dissent and to 
have chosen otherwise; it only arises in a context in which women are not left without the 
means to be ‘self-supporting’ in society.
It seems that those limited but essentially ‘reasonable requirements’ can only be 
secured through a certain idea of education, in schools, that supplements the education 
given by parents, without having to exert authoritarian intrusions on family life. That is, 
there must be minimum resources that are given to all children, boys and girls, through a 
public education protected, funded and promoted by the state. This does not mean that 
private and religious schools chosen by parents have to disappear, but it does mean that
5 5 Cohen, Joshua. ‘Moral pluralism and political consensus’, forthcoming in The Idea of 
Democracy. (Copp, Hampton and Roemer ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
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the state has some control over the education they give, so that those minimum resources 
are given to all, and so that the early learning of a radically different conception of the 
person, depending on the gender, does not predetermine the subjection of women to men 
when the generation now in schools come of age. Schools are therefore here conceived 
of as a space where resources and knowledge to develop as full members of society is 
given equally to both girls and boys. They are also conceived of as a space where the 
right that children have to the resources necessary to modify, challenge or reject their 
parents’ choices and idea of the good life, of their community’s beliefs, is applied and 
secured.
Schools should therefore be defined to some extent as an agnostic space as 
regarding conceptions of the good life. They should be the place for developing the 
public use of reason, and for the development of the necessary capacities for what John 
Rawls calls ‘reasonable disagreement’: ‘We say that reasonable disagreement is 
disagreement between reasonable persons, that is, between persons who have realised 
their two moral powers [capacity for a sense of justice and capacity for a conception of 
the good] to a degree sufficient to be free and equal citizens in a democratic regime, and 
who have an enduring desire to be fully cooperating members of society over a complete 
life. We assume such persons share a common human reason, similar powers of thought 
and judgment, a capacity to draw inferences and to weigh evidence and to balance 
competing considerations, and the like.’56 This means that there is some state 
intervention to secure that all receive the necessary cultural means to develop and weigh 
competing conceptions of the good and ideas of justice (which supposes that even private 
schools are not given absolute freedom of definition of the way children are educated; 
certain minimum standards are imposed).
Clearly, this conception of education will be held by some to represent an 
unacceptable threat to cultural difference. An alternative liberal position would be to only 
secure at the ‘age of reason’ the ability to leave a certain community, when and if women 
stop believing in the legitimacy of their being relegated to certain tasks. The physical 
ability to leave is important and has to be protected as well. It must however be 
complemented by a conceptual capacity to do so, and at a price which is not greater than 
the price boys of the same generation have to pay to make the same move. The state has 
the responsibility not to abandon individuals in the closed circle imposed by the 
educational choices of parents. In effect, this would mean accepting that some be 
brought up to believe that they are naturally inferior and that their nature prepares them to
5 6 Rawls, John. ‘The domain of the political and overlapping consensus’. New York University 
Law Review. Voi. 64, n. 2 (May 1989), pp. 233-255.
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serve others. Stating that respect for cultural difference implies that other beliefs are not 
to be challenged, where it is central to the meaningful reproduction of a certain culture 
and way of life, is equivalent to arguing that if the belief that a race is inferior to another 
and naturally fit to serve is vital to the reproduction of a culture, it has to be respected.
Furthermore, identifying one moral principal with the survival of the whole 
culture seems to enter into contradiction with the way cultures change and reproduce 
themselves. Cultures are made of pluralities of beliefs, moral principals and even 
conceptions of the meaning of life, and it is a sign of their vitality that some or all of those 
are altered over time, without losing their capacity to give a means of recognition to 
people that belong to them. The challenge that the notion of equal access to knowledge 
for boys and girls poses to any culture is limited. A school truly conceived as the 
agnostic place of public use of reason does not have to make intrusions, for example, in 
the religious terrain. Scientific knowledge must not be given in a different way to male 
and female children, but religion may. What has to be secured is equal access to maths, 
not to the Torah.
Besides what has been said so far, the controversies that arise in society about the 
role of women, and that are described as disagreement between traditions are perhaps 
better described as the experience of shared conflicts,57 This is why better than 
‘respecting a tradition’, which is therefore largely stereotyped in describing it as unitary, 
one should be concerned with the protection of personal autonomy from state 
authoritarianism, and, inseparably, from family or community tyranny. The tension 
between those two concerns constitutes a difficult philosophical and practical problem, 
which is not resolved through facile claims about respecting ‘otherness’.
Meaningful work or loss o f the self.
What has been said so far has some consequences for the concept of work, and 
domestic labour, a question on which I will only make some remarks directly linked to 
my argument here.
For the understanding of the threats to independence that the traditional 
conception of division of labour has supposed for women, it is useful to begin with what 
Steven Lukes has called the ‘Kantian’ concern of Marxism with exploitation, as well as
5 7 The following example can make this concept clearer. The arguments about the way to treat 
Muslims in western societies should acknowledge that an important part of the controversies 
around the place of, say, Algerians in French society arise from the shared conflicts constituted in 
the colonisation, in the war of Algeria, in the emigration, rather titan from the inherent different 
understandings that arise from a Muslim culture.
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its ‘perfectionist’ concern with alienation.58 Following Rousseau, Marx reconstructs the 
concept of labour as a process made meaningful through the species being objectifying 
itself in an object, in a product, and then recognising itself in the product. Alienation and 
estrangement intervene inseparably when not only the object of labour, but the definition 
of its orientation, of its meaning, is taken from the species being: ‘Just as in religion the 
spontaneous activity of the human imagination [Phantasie ], of the human brain and the 
human heart, operates independently of the individual ... so is the worker’s activity not 
his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self.’59
It is the loss of her self that is experienced by the woman whose vocation has 
already been defined and ‘naturalised’ by others, society, her community and/or her 
relatives and companions, in a way which leaves her without control. In the sphere of 
labour genuine consent matters; again, genuine consent means only that it has been 
possible to choose overwise. For example, devoting oneself to domestic labour or 
subordinating one’s possibilities of meaningful work to the care of others is a possible 
choice, but no choice is unrevisable. The idea that there is fine worthy way of life which 
should be encouraged, that lies at the heart of the perfectionist dimension of the idea of 
alienation, is therefore here re-formulated in that labour should switch from the 
estrangement, which implies a loss of self-meaning, to meaningful work as a claim to 
civil personality. (‘Work’ designates here any effort directed to being self-supporting 
and/or contributing in any manner to the well-being o f others, which includes any effort 
of this sort made in the domestic sphere and generally, in Kant’s terms ‘any skill, trade, 
fine art or science’.60 Thus defined, what makes it meaningful is not its content but the 
fact that significant consent has been given to it).
As I said, an unrevisable consent, a consent for ever to a certain contract, in this 
case a relegation of domestic tasks, is unreasonable. Further to what as been said so far, 
necessity of revision arises because people at one moment of time cannot even imagine 
what their future selves will be. Those future selves will have the memory of previous 
experiences, and will keep and rearrange some of the previous commitments: there is
58 Lukes, Steven. Marxism and Morality. London: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 87.
50 Marx, Karl. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts o f 1844. DirkJ. Slruiked. New York: 
International Publishers, 1964, p. 111.
60 It will be noticed that the definition of work adopted here aims at not distinguishing between paid 
work performed in the market place and domestic labour. It is definitely one of the most striking 
paradoxes of the definitions of femininity that the interpretation of female nature as fragile and 
sensitive is rendered compatible with an idea of inborn vocation for the fatiguing, monotonous and 
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therefore a continuity of the self, and a basis for moral reflection, but we cannot sign a 
contract for ever, that precludes the changes we make. The degree of solidarity that we 
feel with some of our previous commitments varies, even when we still are able to 
identify ourselves as us, as the person who has been all those selves that are going to die 
all at once. When Charles Swann is at the peak of his distress for the love of Odette de 
Crdcy, he realises with renewed anguish that he cannot even desire this painful love to 
disappear, because that would mean that his present self would no longer live. When, in 
the first moment of love, some men and women make agreements for the rest of their life, 
the desire to never revise it can only be understood as the impossibility of even imagining 
—and at any rate desiring— the death of their present loving self, not as a clause to be 
enforced. Revisability is therefore essential, as should be the opportunities for any 
person who has decided to relegate himself or herself to the domestic sphere for a time to 
revise this choice, and to be given, among other things, the educational and institutional 
possibility to do so.61
A short word on women and their nature . The problem o f child-bearing.
Most aspects of child-rearing and domestic work have been examined above. 
There is however a question which I have defined as the ineradicable difference between 
men and women, and which has not been specifically mentioned so far, namely the 
problem of child-bearing.
An assumption is often made, either explicitly or implicitly, that women are more 
inclined to want children than men, and to ‘care’ about them. Sociologically, the 
impression could be that this is the case, but it does not survive a second analysis. Men 
cannot be said to renounce so easily the perpetuation of themselves through children to 
which they can pass on resources of all sort. The persistence of their identity, their 
culture, their beliefs, through their descendants seems to be as important for them as for 
women. The relevant aspect of the difference of desire for children must therefore lie 
elsewhere.
A dimension of the explanation must be through the biological difference between 
the two genders as to the age in which they have the ability to have children. Each young 
woman knows that the use she can make of her own body to have children is not
® 1 Payment is significant both as a practical foundation of autonomy and the most powerful 
recognition of worth provided by modem society. Payment for housework, however, is too 
complex an issue to be delt with adequately here.
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unlimited —it seems that in medical terms the ‘best’ age is between 20 and 25 and that 
after 40 risks of all sort for the baby and the mother increase. As no decision is 
equivalent to a negative decision, women have to decide in a period which is much more 
limited than for men, a period which coincides with intense career investments. If they 
answer negatively, their possibility to revise their choice will be limited. This is 
especially so as adoption is almost everywhere structured on the model of the ‘natural’ 
family: a fifty years old active woman will encounter more than trivial difficulties if she 
opts for adoption. Knowing that there is a choice to be taken and that, whatever the 
answer, it will in the long run be unrevisable, means that it takes place in women’s 
heads, at an age where their generational male mates can devote all their intellectual 
worries to studying and career achievement, and postpone on a rational planning way the 
problem of children until later.
This biological determination creates here a clear distinction between men and 
women, but not one which can be interpreted in terms of women being more naturally 
inclined towards the perpetuation of themselves through having children. This tangible 
difference in nature obliges us to consider that everything be done for women to be able 
to choose, where limits are not imposed by their beliefs or religion, the moment in which 
they want to have children, and to give all the possibilities not to have to make crude 
and/or unrevisable choices between children and meaningful achievements other than 
through those children. However this seems barely enough. Equality of parental leave; 
introduction of a right to be given half-time devotion at any responsibility level at work, 
for both men and women with children of young ages; modification of the laws of 
adoption so that women can contemplate not having children at the ‘biological’ age, and 
to adopt some at later moment of their life ... This is the ground in which it seems ‘too 
early to tell’, because the demand on institutions go as far as our knowledge and our 
imagination go. It seems an urgent task of any feminist reflection to provide these 
considerations both with a firm philosophical basis from which to start, and with 
horizons of requirements for new institutional practices.



























































































Fem inism  fro m  a Kantian Perspective. conclusion
Conclusion
The idea of feminism from the Kantian perspective developed here argues that:
a. Abstract reason is a concrete way of conceptualising the possibility of just 
relations between members of society. In a society characterised by identity, 
ethical, religious and regional pluralism, the terms of justice and the reasoning 
that underpins it are of greater and not lesser relevance; and that
b. The specific nature of female domination is tied to the biological fact of 
pregnancy and the powerful presence of prejudices and stereotypes linked to an 
essentialist duality, which distinguishes between the nature of men and women. 
Such a context obliges a stronger content and role for universal reason as the 
basis for defining and defending real autonomy, based on the idea that each 
person is a free and equal moral being and is to be treated as such.
This conclusion led to a recognition that there is a tension between justice and 
toleration, which can be reduced to the basic questions of who is the subject of justice 
and who is to he treated as an end. It was argued that if a community is made the subject 
of justice, then it leaves all individuals, but most particularly women without protection. 
The idea of citizenship, so essential to Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls; the concrete 
recognition of the moral autonomy of each person as a free and equal being limits the 
power of both state and community to control the life horizons of children. This is most 
important when a metaphysical distinction between boys and girls is institutionalised in 
educational structures.
The power of Kantian ethics is that it situates feminism within a perspective that 
surrenders neither its roots in the enlightened tradition of reason and justice, nor the 
concrete application in its demands for institutional reform. To rephrase Kant, sociology 
without ethics is blind; philosophy without applicability is empty.
Véronique Munoz Dardé, 
Florence, 19th June 1992.
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